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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The success or failure of fishery managemen plans
(FMP's) is dependent upon many factors. One of those
factors is the level of compliance to the regulations
implementing the conservation and management decisions of
the FMP's that is achieved. Although compliance with
regulations does not guarantee the success of management
efforts, failure to ensure adequate compliance with
management objectives results in failed conservation and
management efforts. Enforcement is a crucial element
towards achieving conservation and management goals.
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this paper is to analyze the maritime
fisheries enforcement system in the geographic bounds of the
National Marine Fisher'es Service's (NMFS) Northe,_st Region.
The purpose of this analysis is to iden~ify lssues and
shortcomings with maritime fisheries enforcement, and
recommend feasible solutions to improve the enforcement
system.
SCOPE OF RESEARCH
This analysis is focused on the maritime fisheries
enforcement system. It is limited to the enforcement of
federally managed commercial fisheries
Act (MFCV~). The MFCMA divides enforcement responsibil'cies
between ~;~e U. S. Coas t Guard and ~1'1FS.
tnis Act shall be enforced by the Secretary [of Com, ere ~
and the Secretary of the department in which the Coas~ G~a~d
is operating"-. The Coast Guard is responsible for ac-sea
e lforcement of the Act, and NMFS lS responsible ::")r shore-
side enforcement of the Act. Since the focus of this paper
is on maritime fisheries enforcement, on:'y issues inv(;~_v~ng'
the Coast Guard's enforcement of the MFCMA will be exp:ored.
Maritime enforcement cannot be viewed solely on t.n,,,
capabilities and effectiveness of the Coast Guard to carry
out its statutory responsibilities under the MFCMA. It must.
be approached as a syst.em. A maritime enforcement. system
links t.he capabilities of the enforcemen agency t:~ the
enforceability of the regulations as well as the prosecution
of violators. Conclusions on compliance can only be j~awn
by analyzing maritime enforcement as a system.
METHODOLOGY
Analysi s 0 f ear:l-~ aspec t of the mar' t im2 en forcement
sys em was COl ducted by review 0 professional rticles and
st dies. Issues and hypo~heses were val ida ted or expanded
by use of current trends obtained from Coast Guard and NMFS
databases and reports. The primary sources of database
information was from the NMFS £nforcement Management.
I Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Public Law 94-265 as amended through
August 4. 1994.sec311 (a)
2
.Information ~stem (EMIS) database, and the Coast Guar8's
Abstract of Operations reports and dighting 2nd Qoarding
Reports (SABRE) database. The EMIS database is u-'e
track violations of the MFCVJA and res Its cf
prosecution. Abstract of Operations repcrts ~rack t ~
effort expended in different mission areas by Coast Guard
cutters, and SABRE tracks vessel sightings, boardings, a~d
violation histories.
GEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION
Analysis of maritime enforcement was const~ained tc the
geographic bounds of the NNFS Northeast Region. Al thougr;
the issues and shortcomings of maritime enforcement are
universal throughout the United States, co~lection and
analysis of data nationwide proved too extensive for thjs
research. '~::le 1i'M:FS Northeast Region was selected for
analysis because the region's high profile fisheries have an
extensive history of management and enforcement troubJ ,"S l ,.,
'- -'
support an analysis of maritime enforcement. II~ addit::on
the data necessary for this analysis was provided by t.wo
separate agencies, and the NMFS and Coast Guard areas 0 f
responsibi ities (AOR's) in this region provide a close
match. As can be seen ~ figure 1, both the NMFS r.:nd Coast
Guard AOR northern boundaries begin at the United
States/Canada border. The l\i'MFS Northeas t Region, for which
the New England and Mid-Atlantic fisheries management
counci J.s (FMC's) have responsibil i ty, extends southward to
2 Any Coast Guard vessel 65 feet or greater in length is called a cutter.
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Fig.l. Comparison of the NMFS Northeast Region and the Coast
Guard First and Fifth Coast Guard District Areas of
Responsibility
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the Virginia/North Carolina border.
Coast Guard District (New England) and the Fi'::-th Coast. GIJ rd
District (Mid-Atlantic)
Carolina/ South Carolina border. Although this additi0'1al
area provides some inaccuracies when comparing NM?S , ,d
Coast Guard data, the majority of the domestic cc-munercial
isheries in this area are conducted North of the
Virginia/North Carolina border and the inconsisl.encies in
data are insignificant.
To further define the NM:FS Northeast Region, an overall
descript ion of addi t ional fac tors and trends tha t a f f ec l.
enforcement such as the managed fisheries in the region,
number of fishing vessels and processors/wholesalers, and
o I-load ports are provided.
Number of fishing vessels. In 1993, there were 23,057
commercial fishing vessels registered in the NMFS Nor:-heast
Region. The maj ori ty of these vessel s (18, 475) we, P sma:, -; ,
near-shore fishing vessels less than 5 net tons. :;...J0.rger,
of f shore fishing vessel s greater than 5 net tons (4, 582)
accounted fer less than 20 percent of all comJnercia __ fishing
vessels' . Trends over the last four years (figure 2)
indicate a slight decrease in smaller fishing vessels, wh'le
the number of larger, offshore vessels remained consl.ant.
Unless a major vessel buy-out or effn~t reduction program is
implemented, the number of commercial vessels requiring
3 Department of Commerce National Marine Fisheries Service, Fisheries of the United States 1994,
Current Fishery Statistics No, 1994
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moni toring and enforcement in the NMFS Ncrt., .3.st ...: , ,W~~.
likely remain fixed near 23,000 vessels.
Number of processing/wholesaling pla;~c .
trends have been observed for processj ng and w olesali 19
plants in the NMFS Northeast Region. Alth:;:g
appear to affect shore-side enforcemen~,
processors and whoJ.esalers affect the available lccati~ns t~
off-load product.
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Fig. 2. Fis ing fIe trends in the NMFS Northeast Region,
by fishing vessels greater and less than 5 tons. F.-:om
at.i.ona Marine Fisher'.es Service, Fisheries of l.he United
States (1990-1994).
Considering the magnj~ude of the ocean area to enforce, off-
load locations provide "choke points" to narrow and
concentrate enforcement effort. Trends since 1985 (figure
3) 'ndicate the number of these facili ties wi 1 remain
relatively constant, with perhaps a slight decline in
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processing plants. Regardless, available off-~oad :o2a~i2ns
for fishermen 1
around 40·.
the NMFS Northeas t Reg io are .u ero _5,
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Fig. 3. Processing and wholesale facility trends in the
l\JM:FS Northeast Region. From National Marine Fisheries
Service, Fisheries of the United States (1988-1994)
Fishery Management Plans. In the NMFS Northeast Region
there are eight federal fisheries management plans that are
the responsibility of the New England and Mid-At~antic
fishery management councils. Those management plans that
are co~mercially active and their craracteristics are listed
in table 1. The Atlantic Salmon and Atlantic Bluefish plans
4 Depanment of Commerce. National Marine Fisheries Service. Fisheries of the United States
(Series). Current Fishery Statistics No. (Series). Offload locations were calculated from the Colregs
Demarcation Line, significantly reducing the number of pons by consolidating all the offload locations in
Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay, New York Harbor, Long Island Sound, Narragansett Bay, and Boston
Harbor. There is frequently more than one processor or wholesaler in an offload pon, depending on the size
of the fleet operating from that pon.
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were not inc''....:ded because they are not commerci lJ.y a::; ~ VP
fisheries. The remaining six fisheries
describe the federally managed comme cia dOL esti2 f ';'S',.1 ~:.. s
that require maritime enforcement in the NMFS Northeast
Region for this analysis.
TABLE 1
Comme cially Active Federally Managed Fisheries in Lhe NM?S
RN.E. eOlon
MANAGEMENT PLAN STATUS OF FISHERY CHA RACTERISTICS
Value $]50 million
American Lobster Over-Utilized Annual Catch 58 million Ibs
Vessels: 2,728
Value $144 million
N.E. Multi-Species Over-Utilized Annual Catch: 159 million Ibs
Vessels 3,600
Value: $]02 million
Atlantic Sea Scallops Over-Utilized Annual Catch 24 million Ibs
Vessels: 1,265
Value: $37 million
Squid, Mackerel, Butterfish Fully-Utilized Annual Catch 112 million lbs
Vessels 3,643
Value: $48 million
Surf Clam/Ocean Quahog Fully-Utilized (lTQ) Annual Catch: 9 million bushels
Vessels: 145
Value: $245 million
Summer Flounder Fully Utilized Annual Catch 18 million Ibs
Vessels: 848
Source: USCG Fisheries Enforcement Study and NOAA Otr Living
Oceans Report
SUMMARY
The purpose of this paper is not just to examine the
capabilities and effectiveness of the Coast Guard to conduct
maritime fisheries enforcement, instead it seeks to examine
r~e entire maritime fisheries enforcement system as it
applies to the NMFS Northeast Region. This area is
characterized by a large and stable fishing fleet and
8
processing infrastructure that produces apprcx~~ately l,46C
million lbs (13% of the nations landings) of ccmmercia2 fish
product annually·. Federal domestic commercial fis~:e.::-i2s
enforcement is directed towards six managed =- ':"sheri P.: .
Although the U.S. Coast Guard is responsible fer ;;,aritiIT:i'
fisheries enforcement in the region, a proper assessmen;- ;;.["'
the entire enforcement system is necessary to detpr' ;.:-'i~ : '.2
effectiveness of the Coast Guard's effcrt.. The mar i: .. ~:12
enfc':"cement system is comprised of the capab~.lities of ~.L2
enforcement agency (U.S. Coast Guard), the enforceability of
~je regulations, and the prosecution of violators. Each of
t~ese components will be examined in the ensuing chapters.
Finally, future en(orcement challenges in the region will be
expjored and recommendations made to improve maritime
fisheries enforcement.
5 Department of Commerce. National Marine Fisheries Service Fisheries of the United States 1994
Current Fishery Statistics No 1994. Figures cited are for 1993.
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CHAPTER 2
COAST GUARD FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT
When examining the maritime fisheri s enL;:rce. iP. 1::-.
system, it would seem logical to first explore thp
enEo ceability of the fisheries regulations and tte~ sspss
the Coast Guard's capability to enforce those regu-at·ions.
That has been the raditional or institutional appro-ch tn
fisheries enforcement evaluation, and exemplifies a "single-
loop" learning approach in analysis. Regulations are eirst
prom 19ated and late it is learned ~~h? enforcpmp;l~ agency
does not have the resources or capabilitips to pr~nrce tho~e
regu at' ons.
A more practical or "double-loop" lear. ing approach
involves assessing he enforcement capabi~ities of the Coast
Guard and using that assessment as a limiting factor in t e
develop en. of reg lations. Tn this way thp actuA,
objectives of he regula.jons will bp met. Fc'. thi.s reasnL
t e chapter on Coast Guard fisheries enforcement precedes
the chaptpr on the enfc;::-ceabL:,:· y of fishE'ries regulat ~ ');:s.
ORJECTIVE
The objective of this chapter is to exa ine the
po icies, capabili::.jes and strategies of the Co. st G ard to
]0
meet its s ::-..=ltutory responsib=-lities
enforcement.
COAST GUARD FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT POLICY
Implementation of specific management measures ~s the
responsibility of enforcement agencies. JanagerrL L a d
conservatio plans will fail without effective J forc-eme .
These enforcement responsibi~'ties are assigned .L. I seet i.r;n
311 of the MFCMA: "The provisions of this Act. s:-:.all be
en forced by the Secretary and Sec..:etary of t.he
department lTI which the Coast Guard is operating'" .
Enforcement responsibility for the MFCMA is divided between
NMFS, wtich is the lead agency for shore-side enforcement,
and the Coast Guard, which is the lead agency for ..3t-sea
enforcement of management measures. To meet :-;le statut;v-y
requirements of the Magnuson Act, the Commandan t ~ F t " .,, .
Coast Guard has stated his policy and objective for
fisher~es enforcement: "To provide the at-sea e forcement
necessary to reach the national goals for living marjne
resource management and conservation".
HISTORY OF COAST GUARD FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT POLICY
Elacted in 1976, 1e Magnuson Fis, eries ('nns rvation
and Management Act (MFCMA) was designed to manage fishing
ef ort with'n the U.S. 200 nautical ~il.e Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) and to build the U.S. commercial fishing
6 Magnuson Fishery and Conservation Management Act, US Code, vol 16 sec. 1861 at 311 (a).
7 Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study.
COMDTINST 16214, Dec 93, p 3-8
II
=- :'.o.u S t ry . Regi::mal . ishery Manage ,en~ C8l:.1::-::_S (?:vrc' s;
determined opU mum leve=- s 0 f f' shing e :fort s for v-:- i :::,: S
to increasing U.S. fishing effort. In the firs. d~~o02 ~~
the Magnuson Act (1976-1986) ,
f"sheries management was on the economic impacts t~ .h~ (l.S.
ish~ g industry. The implementat~on of the ~~igi~2~ ~~:i~y
provisions of the MFCMA were successf 1 in that t Ii? U. S.
f'shing industry had developed extraordinary ~arves~in a~ri
processing capabilities, and foreign fishing h s be II
virtually eliminated from the U.S. EEZ.
The successful implementation of U. S. fisherj es policy
in he firs t decade under the Magnuson Act created new
problems for the second decade (1986-1996) .he
Magnuson Act. The maximized U.S. fishing effort 'n the U.S.
EEZ th~patens the well-bc~ng of the stocks being fished, as
WP.. as ot:'2'- mar~ :le resources n:;t being ti3.rgeted, such as
pr8:ected spp~ies. '::'["1'" policy paradigm c;f i.nvestment and
devp'opmen:= of U.S. c:. s }-1;ng effort in the first decade under
i:l e MFCV.tA :~ d S given way t.o the po_icy paradigm of
conservation and anag'_ en~ of resources 1n the second
d cade.
The Coast Guard's s~Yc=:tegy to execute its s .aClltory
responsibil:ty to enforce the Magnuson Act has also shjfted
to ref ect changing emphasis of the Act. Tn th first
decade of he MFCMA, the Coast Guard's effort was focused on
mon oring the presence and activities of the foreign
12
fisheries policy at that time to limit and remc:ve f~ -t=>j ...-'
fishing while developing domestL~
shifted towards conservation and managemen-
policy paradig~capacity As the national fisheries
in the .-~. _...-,.-~-=' ._ ........ '.rl.l.'-..A
decade under the Magnuson Act, coast G ard enforcem n~
policies have focused on the U.S. domestic fish~ng fleet.
In the NMFS Northeast Region, there is current.y nc
d: rec t or j 0 . nt venture fishing act i vi ties being u.'lder takei I
by foreign fleet s in the U. S. EEZ. With the excep':o.. of
protecting the u.s. EEZ from encroachment by foreign :ishing
vessels, Coast Guard maritime enforcement is directed solely
towards the u. S. domestic fishing fleet;-. Coast Guard
fisheries enforcement effort is focused on the u.s. domestic
fishing fleet and will continue to do so into the futu~e.
COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES
The abi ity of the Coast Guard to conduct m2rit.Lme
fisheries enforcement operations is limj ted by budget and
8 Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Reviewing the Enforcement of
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Navigation 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 24 July 1991, P 83. Statement of Rear Admiral William P.
Leahy, Chief Office of Law Enforcement and Defense Operations. Coast Guard enforcement of the
Magnuson Act began in 1977 and targeted a clearly visible threat to our nation's finite stock of harvestable
fishery resources - the large foreign fishing fleets operating right off our coasts.
9 Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study.
COMDTINST 16214, Dec 93, p 1-11. The Coast Guard has experienced a shift in the nature of fisheries
law enforcement as a result of Americanization Fishery management and enforcement policy changed from
a laissez-faire approach allowing the fledgling U.S industry to mature, to one where increasingly
complicated management measures are necessary to ensure that the overcapitalized U.S. industry does not
exceed the harvest quotas
10 Abstract of Operations reporting indicates that in FY 1995, the Coast Guard directed 30,722
hours of effort towards fisheries enforcement in the NMFS Northeast Region Of that effon, only 345 hours
(1.1 %) was directed towards foreign fishing activities
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resources. These limitations are nr;t mutt ally exc~~ ve;
increasing Coast Guard funding will not necessar y flcr23S2
effort directed towards general Coast Guard ope. at: :;[1S. The
u::-;.que nature of the Coast Guard's budget, as wei as crt""
management of enforcement resources (in t~is case Coast
Gl:C:\;-d Cu t ters) must be fully explored to assess
c-:apabilities of
reg:..:::'ations.
the Coast Guard to enforce
']'LfE COAST GUARD BUDGET
One way of evaluating the Coast Guard's enforcement
capabilities is by examining the Coast Guard's budget,
specifically its operating expenses. The Coast G~ard is a
mu:ti-mission agency, responsible for the administ..-rat.'()n
implement.ation of a vast numbe of progr ms. T.ese prog a s
include Drug Interdiction, Search and Rescue (SAR) , Aids to
Naviga tien (ATON), Defense Readiness, Marine Environmental
Prot.ection (MEP) , Marjne ~ransportation, P-"sheries Law
Erf:ircement, and other miscellaneous law enforcement
responsibilities; such as migrant interdiction.
[T'raditiona~_'y, the Coast Guard ~las received alrost all
of its funding throl.gh two appropria ion ac ounts:
Acquisition, Construction and Improvement (AC & I) and
Operating Expenses (OE). The AC & I account generally funds
major acquisitions, such as the building of vessels,
aircraft and shore facilities. The OE account is used to
pay stdff and activities (operating costs) for the Coast
Guard's various missions. The Coas t Guard received $400
14
~~ 11:on for AC & I activities and $1.6 , ., , ,Dll.. l:-;[l
artivities in fiscal year 1983. In comparison, In f~s2a}
year 1993, it received $364 m' ~lion and $2.6 b' 11.' :-)L
total funding, respectively, for these activit.ies'. These
figures show Coast Guard budget increases ..ave b en di~p~-:t2,'
towards operating costs and no' the cons t rt c t ' (~r; (;
improvemen of facilities. This increase in operat'ng ~os.S
can be attributed to the increased staturcry
responsibilities being placed on the Coast Guard. The :ac::
that funds for acquisition and construction of new resources
has not risen over this time span would indicate Coast .ua-o
resources are being utilized to their maximum potential.
The Coast Guard's operating expense (OE) account is the
discretionary portion of the agency's budget; the Coast
G ard in::erna1ly funds its programs and miss: OI1S by t 'he'
jmportance and va.te ~ places on those programs. Congress
does not mandate the apportionmen of e OE accoun
specific mission areas; it is an internal Coast Guard policy
deter inaticn to set f~ nding levels for its st- tory
responsibilities. Few, if any government agen ies ave so
much discret L)n and 1ati tude cor such a large port ion 0 E
rheir budget. In response to changing responsibilities,
work load, and nat :.onal prior' ties, the Coast Guard must
shift its resources about, increasing funding for some
programs and activities and decreasing its ~~nding for
II General Accounting Office. GAO/T-RCED-93-28.US. Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in
Management of Programs and Activities. 20 April 1993, p 4
15
o::":-:'ers. Table 2 shows the change in per e.t ge
apportioned to each mission between 1983 and 1993.
TABLE 2
Shift in Emphasis Among Coast Guard Missions, FY 1983-~993
Percent of Operati_g Expense Budget
Mission FY 1983 FY 1993 % Change
Law 28.4 33.2 4.8
Enforcement
ATON 23.7 21. 0 (2.7)
SAR 26.8 15.7 (11.1 )
Marine Safety 7.6 11. 6 4.0
MEP 7.3 8.8 1.5
Defense 4.5 5.9 1.4
Readiness
Ice Ops 1.8 3.7 1.9
Source: General Account ing Of f ice.
Improvements Needed in Management
Activities. 20 April 1993.
U.S.
of
Coas t Guard:
Programs and
A review of LIe Coast Guard operating expenses fo:::
fiscal year 1995 reveals the priorities of various lission
areas. The OE account for fiscal year 1995 was $2.631
billion, and accounted for 69% of he tota Coast Gu rd
budgec' . Figure 4 depicts the relative importance of the
programs the Coast Guard is responsible for admi istering by
a ocation of funds from the OE account. Of the eight
general r£lissio. areas the Coast Guard is responsible for,
fisheries enforcement ranks third with funding leve~s
commensurate with SAR, the Coast Guard's highest profi. e
mission area.
12 Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Reviewing the Programs.
Initiatives and Reductions Represented in the Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 1995 budget Request: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., IS March 1994, p 52.
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COAST GUARD FY 1995 OE ACCOUNT
AI..l..OCATION BEl'NEEN MISSIONS
Other Law Enloroemenf' (14.7",(,)
Fisheries Law Enforcemenf (15.0%)
MEP(9.4%)
ATON (21.3%)
Defense Readiness (3.3%)
Fig. 4. Coast Guard FY 1995 Operating Expense Acco 1nt.
From: Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine a d
Fisheries, Reviewina the Programs, Initiatives, and
Reductions Represenced in the Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 1995
budget Request: Hearina before the Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Navigation. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 15 March 1994
COAST GUARD RESOURCES
Coast Guard fisheries policies and capabil'ties re
greatly affected by the functional allocation of a ' "mi ed
number of resources. Coast Guard off-shore law enforcement
are conducted primarily by high-endurance
cutters, medium-endurance cutters, and patrol boats; of
which there are a fixed number that are funded by the OE
portion of the Coast Guard budget. Much of this fleet is
" I'
aglng , and new cutter construction funded by the AC & I
13 The anticipated service life of a Coast Guard Cutter is 20 years The average years in service for
the following classes of cutters homeported in the NMFS Northeast Region is as follows:
378' WHEC 28.5 yrs 110' WPB 7.5 yrs
270' WMEC 9.5 yrs 82' WPB 32.1 yrs
210' WMEC 30.3 yrs
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por ion 0 f the Coast Guard budget is direcr:ed
ncreasing fleet size but toward replacing oJo
neco.omical ~ltters.
rr e small portion of the Coast Gu rd budge, alL;~-:at ~d
owar's acquisi ion and construction cf cltters ; as led t~ a
s ab'':'i zat ion or s1 ight 'ec 1 ine i. numbers fo'- r-11~ C1 t te~
fleet. T e capabilities ofhese assets are generally 01
limited by funding provided by :-)le OE p~Lt';on of ~he CO.=:lSI:
GUc.rd budget. Instead ma~ntenQ':l"t-', repai . , upkeep ana
_eadiness periods limit the effort. capabilities nf Coast
Guard cutters. As cut t ers age more I. ime is req ired .:or
main enance and repair, and less time is available E" -\.'
operations. The Coa t Guard sets underway argel-.s few
various cut ter types; operating budget a.ry i ceases w' 1 .1:;[
result in increased time at sea without adding more
"resources .
T~ increase effort in one missjo area, the 0 S Gua~
mUSl. redu e effort i ano her iS5ion a ea, regardless of
fllnding. The increased corruni tment - nd effort by he (0,- 51.
Guard direct d towards II ari time fisheries enforcement
'equires an equal re uc~ion cf effo·--t directed towards
anotl er miss: on. With a significant portion (over 75'1; in
Future AC & I funds for the construction of new cutters will be for the purpose of replacing and aging fleet,
vice increasing the numbers of available cutters.
14 Department of Transportation, U.S Coast Guard. Cutter Employment Standards. COMDTINST
31005, Dec 94. For example, a 110 ft Island Class patrol boat is targeted to provide 1800 underway
hours/year. The remaining time is allocated to vessel maintenance and repair, and readiness time for other
CG missions
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Fiscal Yea::: 1995) :)_ Lhe Coast G' ard oper t~ng eX~,2;'.S2S
directed towards SAR, ATON and Law Enforcement I t} ~ Coast
Guard had to 'educe effort in one of these t;ree I lSSl.(~;'
~ <:
areas·· . The substantial cut in SAR f~om fiscal yea~s 1983-
1993 and l-he high public visibilit-y of ATON an' SAR m c'e
effort reduction in those mission areas po.1 it i C' a - 1y
nfeasible. The Coast Guard made effort redu ions where it
would be most transparent; with the Law Enforcement m"ssion
area as shown in figure s. Significant increases l '·,.
fisheries enforcement effort from fiscal years 1989-1993
were compensated by substantial reductions l drug
enforcement effort. The rise in general law enforcement
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15 Defense Readiness, Marine Environmental Protection, Marine Transportation, and Ice
Operations account for the remaining 25% of operating expenses. The small effort base distributed amongst
these mission areas does not provide a suitable amount of available effort for reduction
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effort can be attributed to the increase i. eEf8rt reQui r:ci
for Haitian migrant interdiction. A substantial rise in th?
n mber of Haitian migrants requ' :-ed increased en:orcemen
effort by the Coast Guard in the Caribbean in fiscal years
1992 and 1993, and was further compounded by a mass:'ve
influx of Cuban migrants in fiscal year 1994, wh" ch had a
sign"ficant impact on the capabilities C8ast G a ~
fisheries enforcement in the NMFS Northeast Region.
_ 1e fixed number of resources availab~e to _he Coase
Guard makes its fisheries priorities highly susceptible tG
functional allocation battles In times of crisis. Med"
Endurance Cut ters (MEC' s) and Patrol Boat Cur. :...ers (WPB' s)
are highly mobile by nature and can be re-l8cated to areas
where they are most needed. A good example of this can be
round by examining the allocation of MEC and WPB resources
~n the NMFS Northeast Region for fiscal years 1991-1995.
Fishr',::,ies enforcement was a high policy pri8rity for t 12
Coast Guard in this time frame. However in June of 1994,
the nation and the Coast Guard were faced wit.h a crisis.
Coast Guard reS8 .... rces were already stretched thin managing
Haitian I igrant interdiction whe an unexpected surge 0
Cuban immigrants t.y-jed to traverse the Straits of Florida
and enter the United States. Additional Coast Guard
resources were taken from the East and West coasts of the
u.S. to interdict this new flood of migrants. Although the
us' of fisheries enforcement resources for migrant
interdiction lasted only a few months, its dramatic affect
20
on fisheries enforcement in the NMFS Northeast Regi8:: ;~.3r: be
seen in figure 6. The significant dec'ine in cutter he Y',.
available to implement fisheries pol' ,-' es ,ad a dl \ ~i.~
affect on the number of fishing vessels boarded aI,
vio ations of the MFCMA detected.
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in the ~~FS Northeast Region.. Coast Guard Abstract of
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The fixed number of resources the Coast Guard has
available makes its mission p.Li.orities susceptible to the
needs of crisis situations. Although the Coast Guard is
"alwdYs ready" to respond to a crisis, this shuffling of
resources significantly impacts the Coast Guard's ability to
effectively execute fis~leries enforcement. While a short
term crisis such as the Cuban and Haitian exodus in 1994 had
21
a short term effect on fisheries in the NMFS _'LJ ... :':.le.":':3:::
Region, a long term crisis would be devastating.
COAST GUARD FISHERIES ENFORCEME~T STRATEGIES
The Coast Guard's allocation of OE expenses is 01 fr~8
of external influence. The Ccmmandant dictates h:)w th_
Coast Guard meets its statutory responsibility by providing
guidance egarding the appropriate levels of reSOl-~e :i~_
that should be dedicated to fisheries enforcement. The
Commandant makes these determinations based
interactions with Congress, other agencies in the Exec, tive
Branch, the public and the fishing industry' . As a multi-
mission agency, the Coast Guard responds to changing
concerns and changing mandates from Congress Where Coast
Guard policy is headed in the f ture is dif:icult to
predict; however the Commandant of the Coast Guard believes
environmental response and fisheries law enforcement: wil}
rise in mission priority, while general law enforcement wi:l
plateau and it is hoped that migrant interdic ion will taper
off in mission priority·. In general, Coast Guard fisheries
16 Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study
COMDTINST 16214, Dec 93, p 3-8.
17 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 mandated additional maritime surveillance to enforce drug
laws In 1989 the Defense Readiness mission of the Coast Guard was increased through agreement with
DOD to include the defense of harbors and shipping lanes along the US coast in times of war. The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 placed extensive additional responsibilities on the Coast Guard for environmental
protection. In 1992 legislation was passed giving the Coast Guard increased authority to remove over 1300
abandoned barges in US waterways These are just a few recent examples of how the Coast Guard must
respond to changing mandates from Congress that may affect the fisheries enforcement mission.
lR Congress, House, Subcommittee on the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations, Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1994 103rd
Cong, 1st sess, 20 April 1993, p 820.
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pc2.icy regarding budget and resou::-ce allcc:acion is d,
wh~~ of national priorities and crises.
-1· ~
'- :.~
One way to these minimize external irnpa ...:r-. s
Guard fisheries enforcement mission is to make better use of
available enforcement assets to meet escalating de ands fer
en~orcement effort. This is done by employing enforct?lTInt.
strategies. One s Lategy frequently recommended is
enforcement efforts on serious, blatant violators.
th's seems to be a practical and simple strategy,
.- ., !- -,..... . l.-
\.....'----' I.. I ..L~_\
Al t:lOug]j
the Coast
Guard did not establish this policy until December 1995 -.
The purpose of this recent policy is to ensure the use of
Coast Guard resources is being optimized by providing tr"c~
greatest enforcement effort to those violatio:~s most
damaging to the fisheries resource. This in turn will lev~-
the playing field so those harvesters who operate within the
regulations will not be at a disadvantage wi th those that
cheat. This new policy identifies three categories of
blatant significant violations for enforcement units to
focus on:
1.) Violations that cause significant damage or impact
to the resource, including:
-Fishing with a revoked permit O? no permit
in a limited or restricted access system
-Fishing in a closed area or during a closed
season
-Blatant fishing gear violations (gras ly
undersized net or use of a net liner)
-Circumventing/exceeding days-at-sea limits
when effort reduction is in place
-Retention of gross quantities of prohibited
or undersized species
-Gross underlogging in a quota managed
19 Department of Transportation. U.S. Coast Guard. Domestic Living Marine Resource
Enforcement Priorities COMDTNOTE 16240 (Aldist 242/95). Dec 95.
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fishery;
2.) Violations that cause significant monetary
advantage to the violator over his /her campet j, ~::)r ,
including:
-Gross overage in a trip Ii lit [()[ a limi'-.-cd
species; and
3.) Violations that have high regiona_ i, te s~ due t.C
the emotional or political nacure of t~_e
violation, including:
-Deliberate/negligent destruction o~ large
quantities of fixed gear,
-Marine mammal kil~ing or maiming,
-No turtle excluder devices, o~ TED's sewn
shut. ::
Detection of these types of violations will be difficu_t due
to the deliberate and usually covert nature of the offense.
However, without this type of emphasis enforcement effort is
wasted in pursuing minor violations having minimal or no
impact on resource conservation.
This new policy supports the national fisheries policy
emphasis on conservation and management. Its genesis was
brought about by the increasing complexity of FMP' s that
rely on at-sea enforcement. Realizing budgetary and
resource cons traint s to ef f ect i vely execute its s ta tu tory
responsibil i ties, the Coast Guard implemented a pol icy it
previously rejected to improve enforcement efficiency.
DETERMI ING FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT RESOURCE REQUIREMEN~S
Fisheries program managers Coast Guard wide do not
use a standard approach or criteria to determine enforcement
effort requirements. Frequently historical practices or
enforcement asset schedules (conflicts with other missions
20 Department of Transportation, U.S Coast Guard. Domestic Living Marine Resource
Enforcement Priorities
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or maintenance) rather than zero-based program requireme~~s
are used to allocate enforcement effort. Enforcernenc
comprises the most costly aspect of implementing a f' sne::-.'.es
management plan and is critical to achieving ic-.s
objectives Due to the costs and imporcance c·f
enforcement, a standardized and quantifiable me hoo of
enforcement effort allocat~on is needed.
In determining resource requirements for fishe ies law
en forcement, there are several elements to be considered.
First is the level of compliance that is to be achieved. Is
100% compliance necessary, or will 80% or less suffice to
achieve conservation goals? Second is the cost and
effectiveness of various enforcement modes. Resource
managers do not want to be constrained to one enforcement
mode when developing FMP' s, but they should consider the
costs and limitations of various enforcement modes. FinaJ.ly
a method to quantify these qualitative decisions is
necessary to measure the effectiveness of allocation of
enforcement resources.
REASONABLE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE
The goal of enforcement is not necessarily to cat h al.l
violat.ors, but to achieve the compliance of a major'ty of
21 Department of Transportation, US. Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study.
COMDTINST 16214, Dec 93., p 17.
22 M. Pallozzi and S Springer. "Enforcement Costs in Fisheries Management: The Alternatives",
Proceedings of a Workshop on Fisheries Law Enforcement, The University of Rhode Island, Oct 1985,
NOANSea Grant Technical Report 93, p 157.
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f i shermen~' . Reasonable level of compliance is a rela.:ive
term, and generally means that violations in a fishery under
regulation are occurring at a rate which is ~ch lower th~n
at which they would occur with no enforcement, is acceptab~e
to the industry and the public, and 22ntrlb tes to thp
conservation goals established by FMP's
The biggest difficulty in allocating enforce .en_
is defining the level of compliance to be obtai ed. Even if
a desired level of compliance were defined, the exte 1 of
overall compliance is nearly impossible to measure, 0.;'::4
therefore it is not known. NMFS and Coas t Guard do. to.
measures the extent of detected noncompliance whj h is only
a part of overall noncompliance, since a significan.
proportion of violations will go undetected-c.
Quite simply, reasonable level of compliance cannot be
quantified as such for fisheries enforcement. The FMP' s
generated by t.he FMC's do not speci fy minimum enforcement
necessary to achieve the conservation and management goals
established. The determination of reasonable level of
compJ:i'lnce is qual.; tative, and is delegated by the
Commandant to operational co anders. This
determination significantJy influences the outcome of
2J Thomas Nies "Evaluating Enforcement Effectiveness", Proceedings of a Workshop on Fisheries
Law Enforcement The University of Rhode Island, Oct J985, NOAA/Sea Grant Technical Report 93, p
152.
24 M. Pallozzi and S Springer "Enforcement Costs in Fisheries Management: The Alternatives",
P 158
25 Timothy Hennessey and David Kaiser. "Fisheries Law Enforcement, and Incentive Systems
Perspective" East Coast Fisheries Law and Policy, Marine Law Institute, 1987 p 136
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enforcement effort, indirectly influencing Coast
enforcement policy.
ENFORCEMENT MODES AVAILABLE, AND THE COSTS AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF THOSE MODES
There are three modes of enforcement avai~able l , ..,
implement fisheries regulations: dockside boardings, c~tter
patrols and boardings, and aircraft patrols.
Guard is responsible for cutter patrols and boardings, NMFS
for dockside boardings, and both agencies joint ly condu'_ t
aircraft patrols.
The principal mode for at-sea enforcement, cutter
patrols, provide the platforms from which boardings are
made, but are limi ted by weather in conducting boardings.
Although cutter patrols can search small areas to determine
types, numbers, identities, activities, positions, and gear
of fishing vessels, it is the capability to conduct at-sea
boardings that make cutter patrols an effective compliance
technique.
Boardings provide detailed information on catch, gear,
process ing and hold capaci ties, and compl iance wi th data
collection and reporting requirements. It is the most
effective mode of monitoring compliance, for it ensures
compliance with actual fishing techniques; something other
modes of enforcement are unable to do. Unfortunately this
added efficiency has a price; at-sea boardings are by far
the most expensive mode of enforcement.
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In the l.'MFS Northeast Region, the Coast Guard expended
30,621 cutter hours to domestic fisheries law enforcemeG[ ifl
fiscal year 1995:". This enforcement effort resulted l~
4,732 u.s. fishing vessel s being boarded net t ::;g 2 ~o:> .'
-
offenses (5.1% of the vessels boarded) of the Magnusor. Act.
The actual enforcement cost per boarding and cost per
offense can be calculated using the Coast Cu rrl' s da~J y
standard plat form rate from which the boarding was made .
The resulting average cost of an at-sea boarding in f' ' ,LlSCa-L
year 1995 was $5,638, and the cost of enforcement effort per
offense detected was $111,628. The total cost of maritime
enforcement of the MFCMA in the NMFS Northeast Region i;
fiscal year 1995 was over $26.5 million, nearly double NMFS'
entire enforcement budget for fiscal year 1995 Although
the cost of at-sea enforcement is exorbitant compared to
dockside enforcement, it is not feasible to consolidate
fisheries enforcement to dockside modes.
26 Abstract of Operations Database, US Coast Guard,
17 Sighting and Boarding Report Database (SABRE), Us. Coast Guard,
There are an
28 Department of Transportation, U ,S, Coast Guard, Standard Rates COMDTINST 7J 10, IE,
]3 Jul 91, Costs were calculated using the hourly standard rate for cutters within government as follows
WPB 18,505 hrs X $ 493/hour $ 9,122,965
WMEC 11,872 hrs X $],427/hour $16,941,344
WHEC 244hrs X $2.521/hour $ 615,124
TOTAL: $26,679,433
Although the purpose of a Coast Guard boarding is to ensure compliance with all federal laws and
regulations, these costs were calculated using resource effort dedicated primarily to fisheries enforcement,
fishing vessels boarded and MFCMA violations, Other mission areas may be supported by these operations,
but on a secondary basis,
29 Department of Commerce, NOAA NOAA Congressional Budget Submission, FY's 1988-1996,
In fiscal year 1995, NMFS expended $ 15,8]1,000 in direct obligations for fisheries enforcement for the
entire nation
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inadequate amount of NMFS agents available to cc d~c~ d~_
the enforcement, and fisheries managers do not want [8
constrain management options by
enforcement.
limiting the mode ., FvJ...
QUANTIFYING FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT GOALS
In the NMFS Northeast Region, the Coast Guard has 14
medium endurance cutters and 20 patrol boats to conduct
fisheries enforcement along with other st.atutory
responsibilit.~es of the Coast Guard such as Search ,n 0
Rescue and other law enforcement responsibilities Recent
trends indicate these resources are capable of providing
30,000 hours of fisheries enforcement effort a year provided
fisheries enforcement maintains its mission priority. The
important question then follows; is 30,000 cutter hours of
fisheries enforcement effort adequate to meet the
conservation goals of FMP's, and how should that effort be
allocated among FMP's?
The Coast Guard developed an analytical model to
determine enforcement effort by FMP in 1992, although its
use is not as widespread as planned. It is being used
successfully in the First Coast Guard District, but it is
used in the Fifth Coast Guard District. The '92 Composite
Model was designed to use inputs to estimate the enforcement
requirements of each 'ndividual FMP within a defined
geographic area. The resulting output consists of the
30 Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard. Standard Distribution List. COMDTNOTE
5605, No. 134, 19 Oct 95.
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estimated number of patrol hours required for Eis;te:-ies Law
enforcement in the defined geographical area, w:.ich is the'"
enforcement effort goal for a particular PM?
assists regional operational commanders eva~ uar. ~:Ig
resource alloca tion for fisheries en forceme:-::-: wi thin t ::el r
geographic area of responsibility.
A graphical depiction of the Composite Mod is
provided as figure (4). The weaknesses of this ar d any
analytical model is that the output is only as good as t e
inputs. Several of the inputs shown in figure 7
estimates or assumptions and significantly affect the
quality of the output.
KNOWN INPUTS
-The DWl\ber of participants in 6 particular fishery
-The critical status of the fimery(over/fu11y exploltea., underul.l.1J.:led)
-The geographsc duUibution of the fisrungf\eet
-The durat.J.on of the fi.Sh1ng season
-The SlZe and penod of closed Mee.~
1
1992 OUTPUT
COMPOSITE EstnUme,1.ed number of of aircraft. cutter, U\d dockside
MODEL patrol hours required fOf fishenes 18w enforcement by
FMP Within e. user-defined operalJ.ona.l area
1
ASS1JMED INPUTS
-The breakdown between at.-sea & dockside enforcement efforts necessary
-The relalJ.ve inc entJ.ve for fishermen not to comply WIth the regulaLJons
-The conlribuuon of boardings, presence. overfhghts, & dockslde enforcement
vUlts to FMP object!ves
Fig.7. The 1992 Composite Fishery Analytical Model. Source:
Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard
Fishprips Enforcement Study. COMDTINST 16214, Dec 93.
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VALIDATION OF FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT GOALS
The projected enforcement requirements developed by ~~2
model will require validation by regional opera~io a:
commanders. The resulting resource projections may not be
feasible given budgetary and resource constraints.
Regardless, the model will provide a baseline for des 'orcl
enforcement effort,
compared.
to which attainable e~fort ca~ be
A second yet equally important validation of t~e mcd0
:nvolves a comparison of actual enforcement results to the
model baseline. The data reporting and collection efforts
of the Coast Guard and NMFS presently are not capable of
this type of validation, and will require modification to
val ida t e ba s elin e f i gures ~ 1 • The detected non-compliance for
a specific FMP will shed valuable insight on the validity of
assumed inputs to the Composite Model, particularly the
breakdown of at-sea versus dockside enforcement and
incentive for fishermen not to comply with the regulations.
Boarding and violation rates for individual FMP's can be
used to justify changes to the assumed inputs, resulting in
more accurate outputs in fut.ure iterations of model use.
The ability to validate the outputs of the Composite Model
is essential. This validation will indicate the accuracy of
31 There are three databases used to measure results of fisheries enforcement effort by the Coast
Guard and NMFS. The Coast Guard uses the Abstract of Operations database to measure effort
expenditure by geographic area and mission, and the Sighting and Boarding Report database (SABRE) to
measure boardings and violations. NMFS uses the Enforcement Management Information System database
(EMIS) to measure violations and fines. None of the databases are capable of providing information for
each individual fishery managed. The information collected by these databases will only be useable if
collected for each individual fishery managed.
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the model inputs that are estimates, a d ju.stiEJ,-'
modifications as necessary to those inputs.
CONSULTATION WITH FISHERIES MANAGERS
The model output and validated results should b~
reported to fishery managers through the enforcem nt r".port
presented at council meetings by the Coast Guard designee C;-,
the FMC. The Coast Guard's enforcement goa~s establish d by
the model, the Coast Guard's ability to meet those goals
based on budget and resource constraints, d tl results nf
those ef fort s should be presented to the FMC's. T11e FMC's
will be better able to provide input to the adequacy nf
Coast Guard enforcement goals, as well as the validi ty of
the estimated inputs to the model. In turn, the Coast Guard
will be providing the FMC's with quantifiable measures as to
the enforcement effort available to implement policy
decisions. A quantifiable report on the capabilities or
thereof to enforce new fisheries plans wil
significantly influence the outcome of fisheries policy.
MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ENFORCEMENT
In 1987, 1990 and 1993 the General Accoun ing Office
reported the Coast Guard did not have adequate systems in
place to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of its
programs-'· . Such systems would help the Coast Guard manage
its activities and allocate its resources effectively.
Performance measurement systems would also assist both the
32 General Accounting Office. GAOrr-RCED-93-28. Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in
Management of Programs and Activities, 20 April 1993, P 10.
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Coast Guard and others notably Congress in acc or, te.'-y
assessing the Coast Guard's resource needs. Congress (bo'-.
the House and Senate appropriations committees) have
frequently and severely criticized the Coast Guard s-=-:~:'e
1984 for more complete justification for the allocat~~~
operating 'nexpenses The need for the Coast Guard tC)
develop measures of effectiveness for its fisheries
enforcement mission have never been greater.
The Coast Guard spent 395 m'llion dollars in direct
operating costs for fisheries enforcement in fiscal year
1995'" . Justification for this large outlay of funds lS
necessary to quantify how much enforcement is being bought.
This justification will help fishery managers make
management decisions with the costs of enforcement in mind.
The resulting policy decisions should bear out the costs and
benefits when determining how much or litt.'-e at-sea
enforcement is desired to achieve management objectives.
The present attempts at estimating enforcement costs in the
regulatory impact analysis of FMP's are inadequate and
unrealistic.
JJ Congress, House, Subcommittee on the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations, Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1994. 103rd
Cong, 1st sess., 20 April 1993, p 820.
.14 Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Reviewing the Programs,
Initiatives, and Reductions Represented in the Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 1995 budget Request Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation. J03rd Cong., 2nd sess., 15 March 1994, p 52
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PROBLEMS WITH
ENFORCEMENT
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS OF FISHERIES
An effective measure of the quality of enforcement Las
eluded the Coast Guard for years. This problem is
unique to the Coast Guard; it is common in any natural
resource enforcement scheme. Detected non-compliance ca. be
measured, but since no one witnesses or reports infractions
to the resource, undetected non-compliance cannot be
measured and is unknown. unlike urban crime, where the
actual number of burglaries, auto thefts, homicides, etc.
are known and can be compared to the arrest and conviction
rates to measure enforcement effectiveness, noncompliance
with the MFCMA is not measurable. As a resul t, the Coast
Guard has used effort expenditure and violation counts
instead of established goals to monitor and evaluate
fisheries law enforcement ef fecti veness, even though this
effort has not been accurately demonstrated to improve
effectiveness in protecting resources';. To achieve bet ter
enforcement
measured?
l' .pO.LlCleS, the question becomes what should be
Optimum yield, the long term goal of any fishery, has
frequently been cited as a unit of measuring enforcement
effectiveness. In fact the 1980 Fisheries Law Enforcement
Program Model II (FLEPM II) attempted to link enforcement
effort with a percentage deviation in attaining optimum
35 Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study.
COMDTINST 16214, Dec 93, p 17.
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yield with inconclusive results The problem wierl t~:-=-s
approach is that optimum yield is imprecisely defined and
several outside elements influence optimum yield (we eher,
pollution, economics, environmental conditions, etc.) to
establish a link between the two.
To develop a quant i f iable method 0 f det ermining :"';;e
effectiveness of its fisheries law enforcement program, the
coast Guard should establish enforcement effort goals and
alow fisheries managers to provide input whether ~1a
effort is adequate to achieve conservation goals. To link
enforcement goals with conservation goals, the enforcement
goals require some basic characteristics to allow the
effectiveness of those goals to be measured. First
enforcement effort goals should be allocated by individual
FMP's. The number of participants in a fishery, the status
of the fishery, incentive for fishermen to comply/not comply
with regulations, and geographic distribution of the fishing
fleet are just a few factors that make enforcement of each
individual FMP unique. Enforcement goals cannot and should
not be set on the sole basis of geographical area. Second,
goals for enforcement effort should be validated. Do the
enforcement requirements of a particular FMP exceed the
capability of the Coast Guard to meet the enforcement goals?
If the Coast Guard can meet the enforcement goals for an
FMP, is the resul t ing compliance acceptable to the
conservation goals of the FMP? Finally, fishery managers
36 Thomas Nies. "Evaluating Enforcement Effectiveness". p 146.
3S
should review the goals and validation
effort, both to provide policy guidance to the Coast Guara
regarding enforcement effort goals and to adjust fisl e:::~es
policies if enforcement requirements for an FMP exceed tIe
enforcement capabilities of the Coast Guard. his itera'::ive
nature will keep enforcement effort current to the changes
in fisheries technology, enforcement strategies and
fisheries policy over time.
SUMMARY
In the NMFS Northeast Region, the Coast Guard is
capable of providing 30,000 cutter hours for the purpose of
maritime fisheries enforcement. This amount of effort
should be considered a ceiling, as it is limited by bOLh
budgetary and resource 1 imi tat ions. Wi thout iJicreases in
both of these areas, fisheries enforcement effort cannot
increase.
~he Coast Guard has just 34 cutters in this region
capable of off-shore fisheries enforcement, these multi-
mission vessels are also responsible for other operations
which the Coast Guard has responsibi:ity. Maritime
fisheries enforcement is at or nearing a peak in mission
priority, competition with existing or new missions mandated
by Congress may reduce the cutter effort available for
maritime fisheries enforcement. In addition, periods of
maritime related crises also reduce cutter effort available
for fisheries enforcement.
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Increases 1n Coast Guard statutory responsibilities
have resulted in a significant increase in Coast Gua~o
operating costs over the last decade. This 1S reflected ir.
the Coast Guard's budget, as the operating expense accou~
has seen a significant rise while the acquisitic ,
construction and improvement account has remained re-atively
flat over the last decade. This has resulted 1r. a
stabilization or slight decline in numbers for an aging
cutter fleet. The available effort cut ters are able 1-,.,L .... )
direct towards all Coast Guard missions is limited more by
maintenance, repair and upkeep requirements than operating
funding. As this fleet ages, less time becomes available
for competing Coast Guard missions.
The Coast Guard must address these limitations to two
entities; Congress who controls the budget, and fisheries
managers that implement increasingly complex FMP's.
Congress needs quantifiable input whether the Coast Guard
has the resources to carry out its statutory
responsibilities. The Coast Guard has been unable to
adequately justify its budget to Congress for years. In
light of Congressional budget constraints imposed by the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, the Coast Guard will only be
successful in increasing cutter resources if it can quantify
and justify the need for more cutter effort. Increasing
funding to the AC & I account to modernize and expand the
cutter fleet will require quantifying effort needed for all
mission areas, particularly fisheries enforcement.
37
It will
also require an established method to meas'c.:re
effectiveness of fisheries enforcement effort.
To quantify cutter effort and establish measurements of
effectiveness for fisheries enforcement, the Coast Guard
must establish enforcement goals and link t .. em
conservation goals.
fisheries managers.
rrhi s wi 11 requi re consul t.at. ion wi t:~
Different fisheries require different
levels of enforcement effort. Allocation of the 30,000
cutter hours amongst FMP's in the NMFS Northeast Region
establishes the enforcement goals. Fisheries managers
should be consulted to evaluate whether the enforcement
allocation lS sufficient to meet the conservation and
management goals of the fishery. The fisheries managers are
also aware of the scientific, social and economic factors
that affect the conservation goals of an FMP, and as such
can help the Coast Guard measure the effectiveness of
fisheries enforcement effort by validating the outcome of
actual fisheries enforcement effort with the enforcement
goals.
To quantify the necessary level of maritime fisheries
enforcement and measure the effectiveness of that effort,
the following actions are recommended:
(1) Make widespread use of the '92 Composi te
Model. This analytical model is a tool to assist
regional operational commanders in establishing
enforcement effort necessary for individual FMP's
(enforcement goals - output)
(2) Modify measurement databases (Abstract of
Operations, SABRE, EMIS) to measure the outcome of
enforcement effort. The data being collected is
not useable because it is not collected by
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individual FMP's. The ability to measure :"-:_2
outcome of speClIlC enforcemenc effort by FMP is
essential to validate the model outputs.
(3) Validate enforcement goals (output) wit;
conservation goals (outcomes). This may involve
increasing or decreasing enforcement effort for a
part icular plan. Fisheries pol icy makers (FMC's)
should be involved in the validation process.
Awareness of the enforcement outputs required by
their management decisions as we 1 as the Coast
Guard's ability to meet the requirements of t' ose
decisions will impact future policies. Inability
of the Coast Guard to meet required outputs will
result in inadequate outcomes and the eventual
failure of management decisions.
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CHAPTER THREE
ENFORCEABILITY OF FISHERIES REGULATIONS
In the development of management plans,
fishery management councils do not always consider
enforcement or compliance when making fisheries pC"i2Y
decisions. This is because the regional fishery management
councils are a complex, highly-charged microcosm of tl e
federal government. The demands placed on council members
by various interes ts is great. Development of management
plans that meet statutory requirements, conservation goals,
and social and economic demands of interest groups strai;l
the management p:cocess. It is not surprising that
enforcement issues are often set aside or forgotten in the
various agendas of council meetings.
Enforceabili ty of management plans and their ensuing
regulations significantly affect the mari .im_ fisheries
enforcement system. With a. limited amount. of cutte.c effnrt
available for fisheries enforcement in the NMFS Northeast
Region, the Coast Guard must manipulate the development of
fisheries regulations so the available amount of enforcement
is sufficient to achieve a reasonable level of compliance.
This is done in two ways. First, individual measures within
management plans must be enforceable so infractions of those
40
measures are de ectable and prosecu~able.
enforce;nent effort is necessary ~o build a slit ble caS2
that wi:l result in successful prosecutir::n c" ~r'2 viol., ~~Y-
if regulations are difficult to enforce. Seconci,
overall management plan must not require excessive
enforcement to achieve a reasonable level of compliaJl~e.
Enforcement requirements can be maintained at a very ,ini a~
required level if regulations first and foremost ere
acceptable by the fishermen, leading to a satisfac~ory 'ev~'
of compliance - voluntary compliance".
OB,JECTIVE
The obj ect i ve of this chapt er is to examine t1l2 Coas t
Guard's role in developing enforceable fisheries regula iOI s
and the methodologies used to advance the coast Guard's
agenda. Keeping in mind that fisheries managers wi_J never
write management plans from an el.forcement perspe~ .lve,
recommendations to improve the Coast Guard's effel:.s in
developing fisheries regu_ations will be made.
THE COAST GUARD ROLE IN DEVELOPING MANAGEMENT PLANS
Fisheries management is a system that is based on more
than one obj ect i ve. The MFCMA states "A ni':ltional program
37 A good example of an unenforceable measure within a management plan was the meat count
procedure under the Atlantic Sea Scallop FMP (50 CFR part 650). Weighing samples at sea is difficult, and
variations in original and thawed weights of shucked sea scallops made it difficult to ensure compliance by
both fishermen and enforcement entities. Changing fishing technology further complicated the issue with
freezer vessels entering the fishery. The case of United States v FlY Alice Amanda (987 F.2d 1078, 1993)
highlights the frustration offlsherman, the USCG, NMFS, and NOAA General Counsel in failed
enforcement effort of meat count regulations. Amendment 5 to the Sea Scallop FMP removed the meat
count standard
3R Pat Carrol. "Enforcement and Setting Regulations". Proceedings of a Workshop on Fisheries
Law Enforcement, The University of Rhode Island, Oct 1985, NOANSea Grant Technical Report 93, p 42.
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for the conservat ion and management c ~ the :; sr:el:y :::-2;:;~',l':- ,-:..:>s
of he United States is necessary to p:event overfishirg, r "\..\..
rebuild overfished stocks, to i~lSl re 2cjserv,'1.tioli, ann
realize the full potential of the Nation's f'she __::y
resources" '. This statement broadly defines che cld.:..i~'rla.:c
fishery policy for the United States; further deFi i:=-. 'on cf
specific objectives are provided as na;:.' enal s,.,=mdarc s
wi t.hin the act. As with many policies, the individ A~
objectives are reasonab~p but are
viewed as a whole.
Rothschild (1985) suggests that a unified, Cd c-~Eu ly
constructed fishery policy is essential to achieve the best
use of our fishery resources. A unified po icy is neceSSAry
as a guide ine for effective decis=-cn rna}cing, for wi::~~:-:-..:t
such guide ines organizations will be engaged ~ activities
rather than being charged with specific results·'o. The
Magnuson Act is a unified fisheries policy, and i assigns
responsibility for enforcing fisheries policy to the
Secretary of Commerce and to the Coast Guard. n the fir -
'ecade of the MrCV~, th~ Coast Guard's ini ial approach ~o
the fisheries ~nforceme. twas ana.ogous .n weimer an.d
Vin'n.g's "old public administration" paradigm. Tre major
objective was efficient execlltion (enforcement) of a program
39 Magnuson Fishery and Conservation Management Act. US. Code, vol 16 sec 1851 at (2)(a)(6)
~o Brian 1 Rothschild, "The Need for Analysis in the Development of United States Fisheries
Policy", p 199
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(the Magnuson Act)
This ideal of sound
established by the pclitL:::al proc~ss .
enforcement insulated from tohe ar::: 0 =-
politics resulted in Rothschild's activity oriented V2~SU~ 0
res It oriented approach to fisheries enfcrceme .t, which w -
unsuccessful. This failure resulted in a paradig~ sh~=t by
the coast Guard in the second decade of the MFCMA r.c wha~_
Weimer and Vining characterized as t~e "new publ i:-:
adminis trat ion": where practi I- i oners (the Coas t Guard) seek
tc in:luence the adoption as wel~ as the implementatior. ~~
policies (enforceable fisheries regulations)~-. Effective
participation in the political process achieves a resL.i.J ~
oriented approach to fisheries enforcement: compliance with
the regulat ions. Therefore the Coast Guard mus t becom
politically involved even though its primary focus rema'ns
operational decision making.
The Coast Guard needs to analyze ways of achieving its
obj ectives. Thi s analysis is needed because in fisheries
policy, decisions are continuaJ ly and typically being made
without the decision-makers having other than intuitive
ideas about the consequences of their decisions.
Consistently good decisions can only arise from aT;
understanding of their consequences, and such understanding
can only be arrived at through analysis which is explicitly
41 David Weimer and Aidan Vining, Policy Analysis and Related Professions, p 4.
42 David Weimer and Aidan Vining, Policy Analysis and Related Professions, p 8.
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designed to aid decision making'. It is crucial !::r the
Coast Guard to inform decision-makers of the consequences of
their decisions to effectively advance the Ccast Gu?rct
agenda.
The role of enforcement analyst is carried out by t, 2
Coas t Guard des ignee to the regional fishery 'lkl;lagemen t.
councils. The Magnuson Act provides the Coast. Gdard with a
non-voting seat on each regional council. The Coast Guard's
role is to advise the Council on mat.ters regarding he
enforcement of fisheries regulations at sea and t.o provide
input on the safety impact of proposed council actions.
Because fisheries management is becoming more focused
on allocating fish stocks among user groups, several agendas
of experlence, constituency, and loyalty are at play on the
councils 4<. The Coast Guard designee on each council must be
able to systematically evaluate the consl-ituencies,
loyalties and obj ect i ves of various council members.
Through this analysis, the Coast Guard designee can shape
the Coast Guard's agenda to influence the development of
fishery management. plans that meet Coast Guard object.ives.
Since the Coast Guard designee has a non-voting seat on
the council, that person must be able t.o persuasively
advance Coast Guard objectives with the voting members. As
a result, the Coast Guard representative must have the
43 Brian l Rothschild, "The Need for Analysis in the Development of United States Fisheries
Policy", p 200,
44 Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study,
COtvIDTrNST 16214 Dec 93, p 7-4,
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credibility, maturity, judgment and perscnality tc repY;'se:"i-
Coast Guard interests and interact with council me:-:±Jers.
Although each of these traits are important, credibility "
the key issue. The other traits can be manipu ated by
individual selection of the Coast Guard co neil desigrp~.
Many factors can affect the credibility of the Coas~.
Guard council designee, and substantial efforts hav: bee::
undertaken to bolster the designee's credibility. Several
recommendations of the Coast Guard fisheries e~forc ment
study have been implemented:
The
person,
Coast Guard designee is a more senior
Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) or above;
-The Coast Guard has developed a close working
relationship with m1FS management and enforcement
since the ~WFS Regional Director has the sole
federal vote. This coordination bolsters the
credibility of the Coast Guard designee;
-The District Commander (Rear Admiral)
periodically attends council meetings. The
designee's credibility is bolstered by sending a
clear signal to the council that the designee has
the District Commander's ear;
In important fisheries districts, the Coast Guard
designee will have post-graduate training in
fisheries management or marine affairs';
A rnaj or issue 0 f credibi 1 i t.y for Coas t Guard counci 1
designees centers around establishing a Coast Guard vote on
t.he council. Several studies have advanced this
recommendation to increase the Coast Guard's ability to
45 Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study,
COMDTINST 16214. Dec 93., p 7-10.
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affect policy decisions"". The Coase Guard oppcses a vc~iDg
position on the council for credibility purposes. Tte
reasoning is that the allocation issues now being decideS by
the councils are of such an emotional and economic magnit e
that it would be counter-productive for the Coast Guard
become a voting member. It is more productive for the Coast
Guard to cont inue to remain neu tral and be able speak.
persuasively to all sides on enforceability and safety
. "lssues .
ENFORCEABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES
One of the Coast Guard's objectives for its fisheries
law enforcement program is to ensure the enforceability of
fisheries management measures through more effective
involvement in the fisheries management process . This
objective is being achieved by the Coast Guard designees to
the fishery management councils that credibly address
enforcement issues and further the Coast Guard's agenda.
The resource managers on the regional councils focus on
issues of conservation and allocation, and expect to receive
Coast Guard fisheries law enfor ement services which supporr
their management plans and objectives"". This is one reason
.jG Both the Massachusetts task force and National Research Council are two of the more prominent
studies that have advocated a voting role for the Coast Guard on the councils.
47 D fepartment 0 Transportation, U.S Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study.,
COMDTINST 16214. Dec 93, p 7-7
4R Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study..
COMDTINST 16214 Dec 93., p 8-2.
49 Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study,
COMDTINST 16214 Dec 93., p 4-7.
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why it is imperative the Coast Guard quantify tl e ,-me 'n~
enforcement effort available for each management plan 0
proposal. The Coast Guard issue of the en:=orceabi'ity ef
council measures is related to, but must compete wit;~, the
overwhelming issues of conservat ion and al'_ocat:::~C':.
bring the issue of enforceability on equal foot~~g with
often conflicting issues of conservation and alloca~~on,
Coast Guard must characterize enforceability in such a way
that it reaches the forefront of the political agenda.
Issues in conflict vary along several dimensions, o:Jd
it depends upon how an issue is defined that has ~mportant
bearing on the nature and eventual outcome of a conflict'-.
Centrol over how the issues are characterized means control
over the choice of battlefields upon which a conflict will
take place. A group will always select a battlefield that
gives it an advantage in terms of support. That battlefield
can be selected by defining the issues in four ways: (1)
specifying the objective, (2) the scope of significance, (3)
the degree of precedence, and (4) constituent support.
How speci fic an objective is depends upon how
abstractly or concretely the objective is defined.
Objectives need to be concrete and clearly enunciated to
effectively define the importance of an issue.
Improving the enforceability of fisheries management
measures is a vague and abstract objective, even though from
50 Roger W Cobb. and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics The Dynamics of
Agenda Building. p 96.
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past experience the Coast Guard and f' shery m- ngel~s hav!'"
learned what measures are unenforceable and resu'c i~ non-
compliance. To clarify the objective, t 112 Coast Guard 1103-
recently conducted a survey of agencies involved in the
enforcement of fisheries regulations to develop a "ru~es
thumb" enforcement guide for use by a"l regio 031 fis: ery
management council members and their staff
C
This "ru~es of.
thumb" document will assist council members in evaluat~::-:g
the enforceability of particular management m,:&sc;.y-,s as
FMP's are being developed. It is not an all-encompassing,
definitive guide but a tool available to en ncils for
enforcement analysis '.
A condensed version of the preliminary results of the
survey are provided In table 3. The Coast Guard is
developing a list of specific management options and is
providing an evaluation of those measures. These actions
will characterize the issue of enforceability of management
measures as a concrete, clearly enunciated issue; not as a
vague, abstract one.
The significance of an issue refers to its impact. Is
the issue peculiar to the immediate disputants, or is there
more general significance? The greater the impact and
51 Department of Transportation. US. Coast Guard. CG Memo 5700 dtd 28 lui 95. The Coast
Guard distributed a survey to CG District and Group offices on the Atlantic Coast. The survey was also
provided to the ASMFC, and input was received from Nl, NH, ME, FL, and MD state enforcement
agencies. Preliminary results from the survey were received from CG Atlantic Area Operations, who is
compiling the "rules of thumb" Personal communications with LT Beighau.
52 Department of Transportation, U.S Coast Guard. CG Memo 5700 dtd 28 luI 95.
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number of persons potentially affected by the issue, ~he
more people will seek active engagement in the decisior,
making process" Two significant measures of signifi22_ce
are the amount of money involved and the n mber of peop~e
affected by the proposed program.
Table 3.
Enforceability of Management Measures
ENFORCEMENT AT-SEA DOCKSIDE OVERALL
MEASURE ENFORCEABILITY ENFORCEABILITY ENFORCEABILITY
Permits 9 7 9
Closed 6 N/A 7
Areas
Closed 8 5 7
Seasons
Prohibited 7 7 7
Species
Gear 7 4 6
Limitations
Minimum 7 7 7
Fish Size
Quotas N/A 5 5
Bag 7 7 7
Limits
ITQ's& N/A 6 6
IFQ's
DAS 2 4 4
wlVTS
DAS 1 5 5
wlo VTS
Note: Enforceablllty of measures lS ranked from 1 belng
least enforceable to 10 being most enforceable. DAS stands
for Days at Sea, VTS stands Cor Vessel Tracking System.
One of the major concerns the Coast Guard has about
management measures is the impact they have on the Coast
Guard i tsel f . Complex, unenforceable regulations tend to
tie up law enforcement assets and frustrate law enforcement
53 Roger W Cobb, and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of
Agenda Building, p 97.
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efforts. This can lead to a loss of public respect fo~ ~-~
Coast Guard and subject the Coast Guard to unfair criticism
if the management measures fail'. Although this is a valia
concern, it is one that is internal to the Coast Guard and
therefore has minimal significance to the FMC's.
Guard needs to externalize the impacts of manageme:;:...
measures by characterizing the effects of un-enforceability
to a large number of fishermen.
Enforcement comprises the most costly aspect
implementing a management plan and is critical to attaining
its objectives·'. Although this is an important issue to be
considered when developing FMP's, this impact also has to be
externalized to the individuals affected by the management
plans. The negative impacts of un-enforceable regulations
on those individuals must be characterized.
A good example of this can be demonstrated using the
management measures of closed areas versus gear limitations.
Closed areas can adequately be enforced by Coast Guard
aircraft and vessels, and it is an enforcement activity that
does not interrupt legitimate fishing operations. ThA Coast
G ard has ident i fied this as a source of positive customer
satisfaction". On the other hand, gear limitations can only
54 Department of Transportation, US. Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study.,
COMDTINST 16214 Dec 93., p C-5.
55 M. Pallozzi and S. Springer. "Enforcement Costs in Fisheries Management: The Alternatives",
Proceedings ofa Workshop on Fisheries Law Enforcement The University of Rhode Island Oct 1985,
NOAA/Sea Grant Technical Report 93., p 157.
56 Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study.,
COMDTINST 16214. Dec 93., p 4-5
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be enforced by interrupting fishing operations.
gear must be removed from the water and inspected, resulL.ing
in considerable lost fishing time and revenue. ::'h..: s
interference with lawful resource users has been identif~ed
as the greatest dissatisfier for industry' .
By externalizing the negative impacts of un-c:-lforoeab~,~'
management measures to a large constituent groups 500h as
fishermen and environmentalists, the Coast Guard's lSS~2
becomes one of significance. Unenforceable manag0me~t
measures do have negative repercussions for large ~umbers of
people. Sensationalizing the negative effects (lost fis~~~g
time and revenues, fai led conservat ion ef fort s) for large
groups of individuals (fishermen, environmentalists) wi~l
heighten the impact of the issue.
The precedence of an issue refers to the extent t:;
which an issue is a routine matter having more or less clear
precedents and probable procedures for its resolution versus
the extent to which it is extraordinary". Possible
indicators to measure precedence include: the number of
simL ar issues in the past and the degree of success in
implementation, the frequency of such programs implemented
57 Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study.,
COMDTINST 16214. Dec 93, p 4-5
58 Roger W. Cobb, and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics The Dynamics of
Agenda Building" plOD
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in the past, and perceptual knowledge of sU2h pre de ts by
the disputants and relevant or affe2ted decision makers.
The management of domestic fisheries under the Magn~scn
Act has been occurring for nearly 20 years. Curren tly tlle~e
are over 34 FMP's in effect. There is nothing extraordinary
about developing enforceable regulations. Al though ev _ry
fishery is different and there are several options
management, all have been tried with varying degrees
success or failure.
One problem that may be encountered lS the perceptu, 1
knowledge of these precedents by council members. Council
members are to be knowledgeable regarding conservation and
management or the commercial or recreational harvest of
fishery resources"c. New members may not be knowledgeable in
the success or failures of enforcement efforts. With a high
turn-over rate of council members, it is probable the
perceptual knowledge of enforceability is lacking".
The Coast Guard must take positive steps towards
educating council members in the importance and results of
past enforcement efforts. The development of the "rules of
thumb" are a major step in that direction. But the Coast
Guard must also become actively involved with training new
59 Roger W Cobb. and Charles D Elder. Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of
Agenda Building" p 100
60 Magnuson Fishery and Conservation Management Act US. Code vol) 6 sec 1852 at (b) (2) (A).
61 Magnuson Fishery and Conservation Management Act U.S Code, vol 16 sec. 1852 at (b) (3)
Council members are limited to terms of 3 years Members can be re-appointed to the council, but are
limited to a maximum of3 consecutive terms.
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council members through the NMFS in-service council tra': ing
for new council members.
To better ensure results within the council system the
Coast Guard must simultaneously work outside of the council
system to build support for its objectives
constituent support. This can be achieved through a'l
aggressive public affairs campaign aimed at industry and
public constituency groups for fisheries enforcement
activities.
One of the recorrunendations made by the Coast Guar 1
fisheries enforcement study was to expand Congressional and
Public support. The study specifically recorrunended:
Convey Coast Guard concerns and successes in
fisheries law enforcement to State and Federal
agencies, congressional members, indus try and
public constituency groups with a high level of
interest in Living Marine Resources. Establish a
mechanism to receive feedback and manage
expectations.
Present the
enforcement
offices for
media.
relative importance of the fisheries
mission to in-house public affairs
dissemination to field units and the
Maintain increased profile and visibility ~f
program managers through participation with
appropriate contacts in concerned groups external
to the Coast Guard
Coast Guard public affairs offices should
establish contacts with industry media
representatives and promote public awareness of
Coast Guard enforcement activities
Program manager needs to be a visible figure in
fisheries related meetings, forums ana inter-
agencyactivities oi •
62 Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study,
S3
By taking action on these reco~~endations, the aware::-:ess
the strategically important political community will be
heightened. A well planned and executed public awareness
campaign influences the constituency of the decisio - akers
and will further the Coast Guard's objectives.
A correlation can be drawn between the public affairs
support for the Coast Guard mission of Search and Rescue
(SAR) and the Coast Guard mission of fisheries
enforcement. The SAR mission receives extensive public
affairs support and the Coast Guard aggressively works at
achieving maximum media and constituent exposure. Searcl1
and Rescue is often referred to as the Coast Guard's "bread
and butter", and the Coast Guard is viewed with high esteem
and support for its activities. Even with significant
policy changes that had a negative effect on its supporters,
such as the non-emergency assistance policy, the support for
its activities has not faltered. Any proposals that
negatively impact the SAR mission are vehemently opposed;'.
The opposite of the Coast Guard's "good guy" SAR image
1S the "bad guy" role as ocean policeman. As implementers
of often unpopular management and allocation policies,
support for Coast Guard fisheries law enforcement missions
COMDTINST 16214. Dec 93 .. p 8-9.
6:1 For example, the Coast Guard must follow extensive procedures set forth by the GAO to justify
the closure of any small boat SAR station. Any attempts by the Coast Guard to justifiably close under-
utilized SAR stations as a result of mandated government reductions has resulted in vigorous public and
Congressional opposition.
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is lacking. Although it is unreasona le ;:0 expec::: l:?Q'ua~
status for fisheries enforcement as SAR, it lS reasonable tc
expect similar support for fisheries enforcement if simi~~~
levels of public affairs exposure were provided.
The negative image of the heavy-handed ocean police,dTI
can easily be overcome by an aggressive public - -fai~s
campaign. As in the SAR mission, support must be rallied by
characterizing the Coast Guard as rescuers. Only In this
case, the Coast Guard is "rescuing" the environment. A
great deal of support for fisheries law enforcement can be
obtained from many constituent groups by characterizing t)8
Coast Guard as protectors of the environment. The result of
external support for the Coast Guard's fisheries law
enforcement objectives will be strong, as in the Coast
Guard's SAR objectives.
OVERALL ENFORCEABILITY OF MANAGEMENT PLANS
The Coast Guard cannot blindly manipulate individual
measures within management plans without considering
characteristics of the regulations that affect the degree of
voluntary compliance. The more a regulations restricts a
person's behavior, the greater the incentive h has to
violate the regulations, other things being constant'".
Considering the costs of, and limited resources for,
fisheries enforcement, the Coast Guard must balance the
64 Jon Sutinen, Alison Rieser & Jon Gauvin. "Measuring and Explaining Noncompliance in
Federally Managed Fisheries", Ocean Development and International Law, Vo121, p. 340. Conservation
regulations that permit greater flexibility among fishermen are expected to result in greater compliance, but
at the expense of diminishing conservation of the resource and future benefits. This tradeoff may be one of
the most difficult problems facing fisheries managers today.
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enforceabi 1 i ty 0 f individual measures wi thin a pI,,, w-:" t:.
industry perspective and acceptance.
Management measures which are simple, understandab::'e
and consistent with traditional fishing practices m y net
require a high degree of governmental enforcement to i~~u~e
compliance by the industry'-. Other characceriscics or
regula t ions that are important for campI iance inc 1~lde the _~~
stability, credibility and equity of impact Oc • All of these
characteristics may not be attainable, resulting in grea er
enforcement effort directed at one FMP than another.
Stability of regulations. The more frequently a
regulation is changed, the less confidence fishermen have in
the conservation measures within the plan and the fisheries
managers themselves. A good example of this can be found ~!
the Northeast Multispecies FMP that vJas first implemented. lD
1986. That plan required its first amendment the fol:owing
year, and seven amendments in its first ten years 0'
management. the widespread non-compliance with the
Northeast Multispecies Plan reported by Sutinen, Rieser and
Gauvin (1990) can certainly be attributed to a lack of
stability ln the regulat lons. is trend is certain to
continue, as the latest change (amendment 7) is a framework
amendment. That is, changes and adjustments to the plan
will only require 2 public hearings before submission to
65 Pat Carrol. "Enforcement and Setting Regulations", p 43.
66 Jon Sutinen, Alison Rieser & Jon Gauvin. "Measuring and Explaining Noncompliance in
Federally Managed Fisheries", p. 340
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NMFS for approval, greatly expediting the process
changing the FMP. Although this framework amendment greatly
improves the ability of the FMC's to attain conservatL.'::
goals, frequent changes to the plan will reduce v~=-:'::"'.~ary
compliance and burden enforcement.
Credibility is closely linked to the stabil'ty 8f~e
regulations. Fishery conservation regulati8ns ~estrict
current fishing activity to protect and improve future
returns from fishing. If fishermen do not believe .he
short-term sacrifices will result in long run bene~its,
incentive to comply is considerably weakened. Frequent
changes to FMP's further restricting fishing activity
reduces the credibility of the managers and their
regulations to provide future benefits, and reduces the
incentive for fishermen to comply.
Equity of regulatory impact involves leveling the
playing field amongst various user groups. The most
difficult regulatory balance to achieve is between gear
groups. The Northeast Multispecies FMP regulates
gL.lnet ters, long liners and bot tom trawlers tha t seek an
edge over each other in allocation. Additionally theLe is
the competition between commercial and recreational
fishermen for a fair allocation of the resource. Equi ty in
regula t ion is di f f icul t to achieve when scarce resources
must be allocated between large numbers of user groups.
When one group feels the regulations unfairly reduce its
allocation, incentive not to comply increases.
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SUMMARY
The Coast Guard has expended substantial eff8r~ to
identify and implement measures to improve the
enforceabil i ty of management measures. These ef ferts liave
focused on direct interaction with the FMC's by the Ceas:-
Guard designee to the councils involving enforceabiliry of
:r:dividual management measures. The Coast Guard must also
work outside of the council system to build support. for
fisheries enforcement activities through and aggr~ssive
public affairs campaign.
Enforceability of individual management measures is bJ~
one step in developing enforceable FMP's. The overall
management plan must also be acceptable to industry and user
groups to promote voluntary compliance. FMP's that require
excessive enforcement by the government to achieve
reasonable levels of compliance are not enforceable.
It may not always be possible for the FMC's to develop
FMP's that are widely accepted by industry. The Coast Guard
must remain aware of the factors that affect voluntary
compliance wi th management measures, and those FMP' s tha
require greater enforcement effort due to their
shortcomings. The Hrelative incentive for fishermen not to
comply with the regulations H input to the 1992 Composite
Fishery Analytical Model is not so difficult to quantify if
the Coast Guard remains abreast of industry reaction to
counc~~ actions. The Northeast Multispecies FMP, a fishery
with little regulatory stability, lack of industry
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conf idence in the credibil i ty of management measur-es, a:1~
many user groups competing for allocation, has the least
incentive for voluntary compliance and would therefore
require the greatest amount of enforcement effort in the
~~FS Northeast Region. On the other hand, the Squ~d,
Mackerel, Butterfish FMP has regulatory stability, credible
management measures, and few user groups compet -=-:lg
allocation of resources. This plan has high incentive for
voluntary compliance and requires the least amount 0:
enforcement effort in the NMFS Northeast Region.
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CHAPTER 4
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
When examining the maritime enforcement system, t\ e
most significant factor that influences the compliance, the
overall goal of enforcement, lS the prosecu:~on
violators. The problem is that fisheries are a common
property resource, and individual incentives are
incompatible with collective interests. Regardless of the
restrictions placed on a fishery, there is an economic
incentive for individuals to violate the regulacions c
Although economics are not the only factor to be
considered when trying to determine what motivates an
individual to comply with regulations, once the decision to
participate in an illegal activity is made, that decision is
rationally based on the potential benefits and costs of the
offense. Ant i-social or moral codes of behavior are not
considerations at this point. The prosecution of these
offenses need only to remove the rationality of the decision
to partake in illegal activities by increasing the costs of
the offense to the point that exceeds any benefits received.
67 Blewett, E. & W Furlong & P. Toews. "Canada's Experience in Measuring the Deterrent Effect
of Fisheries Law Enforcement", Proceedings ofa Workshop on Fisheries Law Entorcement, The University
of Rhode Island, Oct 1985, NOAA/Sea Grant Technical Report 93, p.178.
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Although the Coast Guard's fisheries e~:~orceme:-:.::: st~;,iy
attempts to look at all aspects of the maritime fislleries
enforcement system, its conclusions on t112
these factors to Coast Guard fisheries enforcemenl:- ::6S
failed to affect the perspective of senior Coast G~ard
management. As recently as 1993, the Conunandant of Lhe
Coast Guard responded to Congress' inquiry into whether the
level of penalties should be increased by stating: " ... more
patrolling is necessary, I have no problems with t e level
of fines at the present time" contradicting the
recommendations of the study. Increased patrolling is not
feasible in the NMFS Northeast Region, and to maximize the
effectiveness of current enforcement effort the Coast Guard
must influence and increase in penalties for violations of
fishery regulations.
The "solution" of raising penalties for violations of
fisheries regulations is anything but simple. Complications
arise when the civil penalty process is examined,
specifically statutory and agency limitations in prosecuting
MFCMA infractions. To understand these complications,
NOAA's procedlires for prosecuting civil penalty cases must
be unders tood. The administrative hearing process must be
reviewed along with the associated problems concerning
penalty assessments.
68 U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. Department of
Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1994. 103rd Congress, 1st sess., p 890
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OBJECTIVE
The objective of this chapter is to highlight the
problems and constraints of the civil penalty process, and
the impl icat ions for enforcement and resul t ing suc-:ess
fisheries management plans. If the economic benefits of
engaging in illegal activities cannot be removed, then other
motivating factors must be considered when developing
fisheries regulations.
THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF CASE PROSECUTION
The policies and procedures followed by NOAA l' .~u
prosecuting a civil penalty case are complex and wi~l be
examined in detail in this section. A simplified flow chart
of the civil proceedings is provided as figure 8.
Document
VioJaI10D of
MFCMA
NMFS Reglonal LED
(Case package feVUlw)
Is e.se legally
sound?
YES
Did Violation Occur?
YES
Fig,e, NOAP. CIvil Proceedings Flow Chart
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DOCUMENTATION OF VIOLATIONS
The process of civil prosecution of Magnuson Act
violations begins with the discovery and documentation of a
illegal act by anyone of a number of different groups of
enforcement officers. Most frequently it is agents of ~re
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) who enforce fishing
regulations. The Coast Guard, as well as various state
conservation officers~c also document violations of the
Magnuson Act. For example, in 1995 there were 599
violations of the MFCMA reported in the NMFS Northeast
Region. Of those violations, 420 were documented by NMFS
agents and 179 were documented by Coast Guard air and
surface patrols'o. These agents briefly document the
violation on an Enforcement Action Report (EAR), a copy of
which is provided to the individual not in compliance with
the regulations. A case package is compiled by the issuing
enforcement agent, with more detailed information included
in the Offense Investigation Report (OIR / . This report is
very thorough, as it may be the only detailed documentation
of the violation. Additional information, such as charts of
the area, pictures, net measuremen ts, spade cert i ficat ion
and statements may also be included in the case package.
69 State enforcement officers may enforce certain federal regulations provided they are authorized
by cooperative agreements. For example, the State of Florida Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has
entered into a cooperative agreement authorizing the Florida Marine Patrol to enforce fishing regulations
pursuant to the Magnuson Act in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
70 Enforcement Management Information System (EMIS)
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Once completed, the case package is fcrwa:;::-ded l ~,-' .
Law Enforcement Division (LED) of the NMFS regionaJ office
where the violat ion occurred. he LED reviews the case,
determining if the accused is a repeat offender as weI] as
ownership of the vessel. Additional infor.ation or
clarification of facts may be requested from the iss) ing
enforcement agent to ensure the case package is comp e e
before forwarding it to the NOAA Office of General Counsel
for prosecution.
REVIEW BY GENERAL COUNSEL
Once the case package is received by the Office of
General Counsel (G.C.), it is assigned to an attorney for
review. The purpose of this review is to decide whe~her the
G.C. should prosecute the case by determining if all
elements of a violation are present. If the case does not
meet standards necessary for prosecution, the case is closed
as unfounded. NOAA General Counsel declined to prosecute
267 cases in 1995, which accounted for 44.2% of the cases
handled by G.C. in 1995. A break-down of cases resolved for
1995 in the Northeast Region is depicted in figure 9. If
the case is legally sound, a Notice of Violation Assessmen
is issued.
THE NOTICE OF VIOLATION ASSESSMENT (NOVA)
The Notice of Violation Assessment (NOVA) is the
charging document to the respondent in all cases prosecuted
by the G.C. The NOVA specifies the respondent, the statutes
and regulations violated, facts surrounding the case,
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evidence seized, and amount of penalty. alsc prcv:oes
options for various courses of action the respondent must.
pursue within 30 days of receipt of the NOVA.
CASE DISPOSITION. NOAA GENERAL COUNS€L
N.E. RegIOn. 1995
SETrLED (42.4%)
PROSECUTED (13.4·1.)
, DECLINED '44 2%)
Fig. 9. Disposition of Cases by Office of General Counsel,
l\TMFS Northeast Region. Source: Enforcement Management
Information System (EMIS)
An important purpose of the NOVA is to specify the
respondent. In most fishing violation cases, both the owner
of the vessel and the captain are charged. This practice is
intended to encourage accountabil i ty and responsibi 1 i ty in
both the captain and the owner The intended result is for
owners to hire responsible captains for their fishing
vessels that will comply with fisheries regulations. Since
7\ U.S Congress. House. Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the
Committee on the Judiciary. Enforcement of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act and
Related Laws and Regulations. I02nd Congress, 2nd sess, 1 Oct. p.80.
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the owner of a fishing vessel directly benefits from l:~~~i~
activities of the captain, this practice is meant t~
discourage owners from pressuring captains to viG~a~e
regulations. The captain and owner can be charged
individually or jointly and severally, usually depen'i19
upon the policy of the regional office of NOAA General
Counsel. The advantage of charging owner and captain
jointly and severally is that only one judgment is
necessary, with the disadvantage being NOAA G.C. must serve
both respondents before proceeding with legal action. The
difficulty is not with serving the owner of the vessel, ':"t
is with serving the captain who is often at sea or otherwise
difficult to locate. It is the policy of the Office of
General Counsel, Northeast Region to charge the owner and
captain jointly and severally .
ASSESSING A PENALTY
Assessing a penalty in the NOVA is perhaps the most
important and contentious aspect of the civil violation
process. NOAA's procedures for assessing penalties will be
examined In this section. Later these procedures will be
compared to penalty and compliance theory.
The regional offices of the General Counsel are
responsible for developing penalty schedules for regulations
that apply within their region.
approved by NOAA General Counsel
These schedules, once
for Enforcement and
72 Office of General Counsel, Northeast Region, interview by author, Gloucester, Massachusetts,
29 March 1996.
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Litigation in Washington D.C.,
assessing penalties for violations.
provide a sta dard
These schedules mus: be
designed to be equitable and fair, while at the same ti"e
providing sufficient deterrence. The impact of the fi e on
the individual must be balanced against the prol.ec~_icr:.
t he resource. These penalty schedules are intended o be
flexible, capable of being adjusted upward c- downward
depending on the number of violations occurring and feedback
from various personnel. A sample penalty schedu e fer t e
Northeast Multispecies Plan is provided in appendix (1).
Several factors affect the determination of a penalty.
Most important lS the determination of whether the
respondent is a repeat violator. Repeat violators are fined
more heavily than first time violators. Thestat ute in
question, the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of
the alleged violation; and respondents degree of culpability
are all considered. Aggravating and mitigating
circumstances are also considered, particularly cooperation
or resistance to enforcement agents". For minor violations,
a warning may be issued in lieu or a monetary penalty.
More serious violations may resul t in seizure of the
catch or vessel in addition to a monetary penalty. Usually
the estimated value of the catch is added to the penalty if
the catch is small rather than seizing the catch'J.
73 Code of Federal Regulations, vol IS at 904.108
Vessel
7-'\ Guidance to Coast Guard units is not to pursue catch seizure unless the estimated value of the
catch is greater than $3,000. Office of General Counsel, Northeast Region, interview by author, Gloucester,
Massachusetts, 29 March 1996 indicates value of catch is always added to the assessed penalty in
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seizure is rare,
violators.
and is usually reserved ::_ :-rd :-_. n t:
Another penalty option is for the enforcement age,~ ~~
assess the penal ty at the time of the violat.ion. Summary
settlement schedules are used to give a inor, f'.rst t'::.. e
violator an on-the-spot ticket. Al though thisis a goo
tool to quickly resolve minor violations of the MFCV~, s
use is infrequent. NMFS data reveals summary set tlements
were used only 18 times in fiscal year 1995, accouncing for
only 3 percent of all cases in the Northeast region·. In
these instances the penal ties are low, and the respondent
has 20 days to pay the penalty. The average penal ty for
summary settlement cases in the Northeast Region for 1995
was $141.67';. Since enforcement agents are unable to
determine prior offense history of the violator in the
field, the summary settlement can be withdrawn by the G.C.
if it is determined the violator had prior offenses or i
further information warrants issuance of a NOVA.
ACTION BY THE RESPONDENT
The respondent is served the NOVA, usually by certified
mail, and is provided with a copy of the rules of civil
procedure which explain the rights and responsibilities of
the respondent. Once the respondent receives the NOVA, he
accordance with penalty schedules. Information on catch value forfeited is not available through NMFS or
CG databases, and the author is unable to verify the actual extent of catch forfeitures.
75 Enforcement Management lnformation System. Of the 18 summary settlements issued in fiscal
year 1995, 17 were by Coast Guard officers and 1 was by a NMFS agent.
76 Enforcement Management Information System (EMIS).
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must respond within 30 days and pursue one cf three options.
First, he can pay the penal ty and the case wi 11 be , "C.loseo
upon receipt of the penalty amount. This 8C2urs
infrequently, and NMFS reports no cases closed il! this
manner for fiscal year 1995. Second, he can attempt to
settle the case for less than the assessed penalty. 267
cases, or 44 percent of the cases handled in the Northeast
region in fiscal year"1995 were settled for an amount less
than the assessed penalty. This involves pleading
financial inability to pay. The respondent will be provided
financial disclosure forms from which ability to pay can be
considered. The financial information provided is
independently verified before a final settlement is reached.
If G.C. is satisfied that the respondent cannot pay the
penalty in a lump sum, installed payments may be arranged or
a portion of the penalty may be suspended with the
respondent placed in a probationary period, running from six
months to five years. To induce accelerated payments, the
G.C. frequently ends the probationary period upon receipt of
the final payment. Any subsequent violation by the
respondent during the probationary period will m ke the
suspended portion of any civil penalty immediately due to
the government. These actions contribute greatly to the
perception of fairness In the penalty process. It is
important to note that NOAA's consideration of a
respondent's ability to pay does not preclude an assessment
77 Enforcement Management Information System (EMIS)
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of a penalty in an amount that would cause or contrib..::e .,'
the bankruptcy or discontinuation of the responde;~c,s
business-' . Finally, if the respondene cannoe agree or:. a
settlement with G.C., or if he is convinced
innocence, a hearing may be requested before
administrative law judge. 81 cases, or 13.4 perce:!:.:. of t;le
cases handled in the Northeast Region in fiscal ye,ci;- 1995
were forwarded to an administrative law judge
hearing" . If the respondent fails to take action within 30
days of receiving the NOVA, the violation assessment becomes
effective as the final administrative decision
THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING PROCESS
The respondent has the option of requesting a hearing
before an administrative law judge, which usually occurs
because a settlement could not be reached or he is convinced
of his innocence. The request for a hearing must be made
within 30 days of receipt of the NOVA, and may be as simple
as making the statement "I want a hearing". Upon receipt
of a hearing request, the G.C. forwards the request to the
Office of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in Washington
D.C.
PRELIMINARY POSITION ON ISSUES AND PROCEDURES
Four to six weeks after receiving the request for an
administrative hearing, the ALJ requires all parties to
78 Code of Federal Regulations, vol 15 at 904.1 08(d).
79 Enforcement Management Information System (EMIS).
80 Details of the respondent's options upon receipt of a NOVA are provided in 15 CFR 904. 102.
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submi~ a Preliminary Position on Issues and P~oce"u.Les
(PPIP) . The purpose of this document is for both parties to
state their legal and factual lssues, listing potential
witnesses and a surmnary of their testimony and exhibits.
rrhe purpose of this document is to eliminate the need for
further discovery".
The PPIP is a simple statement which answers SlX bas~c
questions:
1. What are the legal issues in dispute?
2. What are the factual issues in dispute?
3. Is the amount of penalty in dispute?
4. who will be called as witnesses, and what will
their testimony be?
5. What exhibits will be used at trial, and how will
they relate to an issue at trial?
6. When and where should the hearing be held?
Failure to provide a PPIP within the time frame specified by
the ALJ (usually 30 days) will result in a dismissal of the
hearing. The ALJ tries to schedule the hearing at a
mutually convenient time and location, often near the
locati.on where the violation occurred.
BURDEN OF PROOF
At the hearing, NOAA General Counsel presents its case
first. To prove its case, the agency must only show a
preponderance of evidence - meaning it appears more likely
than not the violation occurred. This point illustrates a
substantial di.fference between civil and criminal
81 Code of Federal Regulations. vol ]S at 904.240(a).
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proceedings. This burden of proof is substantially ectSier
to meet than the beyond a reasonable doubt thresholo used in
criminal proceedings.
Another application of civil law that simp~ifies the
burden of proof for NOAA General Counsel is the impositio
of strict liability when prosecuting individuals
violations of the Magnuson Act. The statutory language of
the Magnuson Act states: "It is unlawful to sell, purchase,
import, export, or have custody, control or possessior of
any fish taken or retained in violation of this Act or any
regulation, permit or agreement" When the Act was
drafted, the requirement for culpability or mens rea was not
included, and NOAA interprets this silence as an affirmation
of strict liability. However, merely entitling a statute as
civil and not criminal does not automatically transform
offenses under the Magnuson Act subject to strict liability.
Although NOAA has not been challenged on their
interpretation of strict liability in applying the Magnuson
Act, precedence for NOAA's position can be found in a
challenge to its predecessor, the Bartlett Act.
The interpretation of strict liability to the Bartlett
Act was challenged in 1976 in the case of United States v.
Ayo-Gonzales" . Ayo-Gonzales argued that intent need to be
proven to result in a violation of the Bartlett Act. In
82 Magnuson Fishery and Conservation Management Act, U.S. Code, vol 16 sec. 1861 at
J85.7i(J)f
83 536 F.2d 65 I. Ayo-Gonzales was the master of the Cuban FlY E-82HB seized in 1975 for
fishing within the U.S 12 nm limit off the Texas coast
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addition, Ayo-Gonzales argued if the statute does l-' ,-'.-1.1,-/<..
reqU1re at least negligent conduct, then it is
unconstitutional as a violation of due process.
Gewin reasoned 1n thi s case 0 f firs t impress ~ ;-;,:: II t.he
constitutional requirement of due process is not violateci
merely because mens rea is not a required eleme:-:.; of a
prescribed crime"". In regard to Ayo-Gonzales' challenge to
the Bartlett act regarding intent as an element of the
crime, Justice Gewin reasoned "whatever the intent of <.-he
violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences are
injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence, legislation
applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not
specify intent as a necessary element"". Proof of
culpability or fault is neither statutorily nor
constitutionally necessary to sustain a conviction under the
Bartlett. Act.
'The strict liability imposed by the Bartlett Act was
tempered by the availability of a wide range of punishments
so that sentences imposed could both serve as an effective
deterrent and reflect any mitigating circumstances. The
Magnuson Act was similarly modeled after the Bartlett Act
and requires a wide range of punishments, particularly when
considering the culpability of the violator, to serve as an
effective deterrent as well as reflect mitigating
circumstances.
84 536 F.2d at 657
85 536 F.2d at 658.
The strict liability nature of the offenses
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was tempered by Congress through its intent that culpabi~~:y
be considered in determining the amount of pen6~ty as
opposed to the fact of liability. Ihis strL::t liabilL... y
precedent is essential in maintaining NOAA G.C. 's ability tc
effectively and strictly enforce the Magnuson Act, ot_ erwise
it would be next to impossible to prove mens rea as ~
element of a crime and conservation efforts would be easy
subvert.
In presenting a case, NOAA General Counsel begins wi h
an opening statement outlining its case and how it will be
proved by the testimony of its witnesses and exhibits.
After the opening statement, the G.C. calls its witnesses
and questions them. The agency also introduces exhibi ts
(charts illustrating the position of the violation, seized
fishing gear). The respondent or his attorney has the right
to cross-examine each witness and examine each exhibit. It
lS important to note that every respondent has the right to
present oral or documentary evidence in support of its case
or defense, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct
cross-examination as may be required for a fu=-l and true
disclosure of the facts. Only evidence that is relevant,
material, reliable and probative, and not unduly repetitious
or cumulative, is admissible at the hearing. Formal rules
of evidence do not necessarily apply to the proceedings,
hence hearsay evidence is admissible'';.
86 Code of Federal Regulations, vol 15 at 904.251 (a) & (b)
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After NOAA General Counsel completes its case, c.he
respondent or his attorney may present his case.
Approximately 60 percent of the respondents retain ~egal
counsel, the majority being vessel owners and dealers. The
vessel captains typically represent themselves 0::::- defa ,.
civil proceedings'. Although not obligated to testify or
call wi tnes ses, most respondents do even it is jl st Ie
explain their interpretation of the situation. G.C. has the
right to cross examine any individuals testifying. The AL,}
may ask questions of any witness, and frequently does.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
In cases involving few parties, limi ted issues, and
short hearings, the Judge may require proposed findings,
conclusions and reasoning support to be presented orally at
the close of hearing' If cases are lengthily or complex,
the ALJ requires post hearing briefs to be submitted within
30 days from service of the hearing transcript. The judges
decision is based on the hearing transcript and post-hearing
briefs.
The Administrative Law Judge has a great deal of
discretion in deciding cases. He may decide a violation did
not occur. In deciding if a violation did or did not occur,
the Judge renders a written decision setting forth his
findings and conclusions. The material issues of fact, law,
87 Office of General Counsel, Northeast Region, interview by author, Gloucester, Massachusetts,
29 March 1996.
88 Code of Federal Regulations, vol IS at 904.261 (b). Parties are notified in advance of the
hearing if this is the case
7S
or discretion, and his ruling on any proposed fi dings 0'::
conclusions presented by the parties are inc uded in t:le
decision". If he decides a violation did occur, t.he AL.,0
makes a de novo determination of the penalty based upon
hearing record, and he may raise, lower or endorse the
penalty assessed in the NOVA. Few constraints l~mit
judge's determination of a penalty. He may not exceed t e
maximum administrative penalty of $100,000 authorized by the
MFCMA, and he must consider ability to pay 'FlL credible
evidence is provided on that issue. However in 1985 NOAA
made a policy decision that significantly altered the de
novo appropriate penal ty levied by the ALJ. This policy
dictated that on review of ALJ decisions, the NOVA penalty
assessment based on the penalty schedules would be accepted
as the appropriate penalty, rather than an increased amount
imposed by the ALJ, unless the ALJ had convincingly
articulated his reasons for the increase".
This policy decision undermines the effectiveness of
the civil penalty process. It discourages violators from
settling out of court, thus increasing the workload of NOAA
G.C. A fisherman is more apt to take his chances with an
administrative hearing knowing the assessed NOVA penalty is
the upper limit he can be fined, and he stands a decent
chance of receiving a lower penalty at a hearing. A repeal
of NOAA's policy would restore the ALJ's discretion in his
89 Code of Federal Regulations, vol 15 at 904.271 (a)(I).
90 In the Matter of William J Verna, 4 O.RW. 64 (NOAA App, J985)
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de novo penalty determination. The ALJ's penalty wi~: 8~lY
be limited by the statutory maximum, making
administrative hearing a riskier proposition for fishermen.
The chances of receiving a penalty higher than the pe~alty
assessed in the NOVA will encourage fishermen to set:~e a::u
decrease the workload of NOAA G.C.
The decision of the ALJ is significantly affected by
the Judge hearing the case. Since the retirement of t1 e
Honorable Judge Dolan in 1990, the sole NOAA ALlJ for the
N.E. Region, all fisheries cases are being heard by
Department of Labor ALJ' s. These ALJ' s are not fami 1 iar
with fisheries law, nor have they been inclined to impose
sanctions that would contribute to the financial hardship of
the respondene:. This has undermined the effectiveness of
the civil penalty process, since violators are less likely
to settle out of court and the workload of G.C. is
increased. To alleviate this constraint to the system, NOAA
has pursued the use of Coast Guard ALJ's for fisheries
cases. It is believed Coast Guard ALJ' s are more
knowledgeable in fisheries regulations and the significance
of those offenses. Office of General Counsel wi:l be able
to pursue higher penalties, and encourage a higher
settlement rate. Ai though Department of Labor ALlJ' s are
still hearing fisheries cases, G.C. anticipates Coast Guard
ALJ's will be hearing fisheries cases by year's end.
9\ Office of General Counsel, Northeast Region, interview by author, Gloucester, Massachusetts,
29 March 1996.
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REVIEW OF DECISIONS
Either side may petition for review of t'je ,Judge's
decision within thirty days from the date of the ~ ;Ht~ d.
decision. This petition is directed to the Administr~[:)r of
NOAA. rl'he review process is discretionary I and not a J:":atter
of right; reasons for declining review need not be giveE .
Although no statistics are maintained on the review process,
Office of General Counsel, Northeast Region reports request
for review are rare; only approximately 50 percent of :~ose
requests actually are reviewed; and changes to the ALJ
decisions are rare c,. The only grounds for review are:
1. A finding of a material fact that is clearly
erroneous based upon the evidence in the record;
2. A necessary legal conclusion is contrary to law or
precedent;
3. A substantial and important question of law,
policy, or discretion is involved; or
4. A prejudicial procedural error has occurred.
The Administrator will not consider new or additional
evidence that is not a part of the record before the judge.
If neither party petitions for review, or the Administrator
declines review, the 1 itial decision of the ALJ becomes
final. If the decision is reviewed, the modification or
endorsement of the decision becomes final.
92 IS CFR 904.273 (b).
93 Office of General Counsel, Northeast Region, interview by author, Gloucester, Massachusetts,
29 March 1996
78
ANALYSIS OF PENALTY ASSESSMENT
Processing speed and severity of penalty are impo tant
criteria in the operation of any enforcement sys~em.
economic theory 0 f crime, the perceived loss from being
caught for one violation must be m~ltiplied by t112
probabilities of apprehension and punishment, and then
compared to the perceived gain. If the gain exceeds t e
discounted penalty, the fisherman will risk violating the
regulation. Simply increasing the penalty to a high .0 gh
level would seem to resolve any problems wi th compel 1 ing
compliance to a regulation, and this is what fisheries
managers often advocate Q4 •
In fact, this approach has been advocated by the
canadian researchers Edwin Blewitt, William Furlong, and
Peter Toews in their paper uCanada's Experience in Measuring
the Deterrent Effect of Fisheries Law Enforcement". They
observe that Uthe commission of illegality ln the fishery
can be effectively controlled by altering the associated
gains and losses", and conclude that enforcement policies of
severe and likely punishment had a strong deterrent effect
~. =
on violations Therefore an analysis of penalty assessments
for MFCMA violations must examine the amount of penalties
and the timeliness of case resolution.
94 Timothy Hennessey and David Kaiser. "Fisheries Law Enforcement. an Incentive Systems
Perspective", p.137.
95 Blewitt, Furlong and Toews. "Canada's Experience in Measuring the Deterrent Effect of
Fisheries Law Enforcement", p.34.
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LEVEL AND TIMELINESS OF PENALTIES
The problem with severe penalties 1S that NOAA General
Counsel has limited resources to prosecute
violations. In the Northeast Region, there are 0 ly ree
attorneys to prosecute violations of not only the MFrrvIA, b1'~
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), Lacey Act, a:1d
Endangered Species Act. It 1S not practical with cut'_en~
national budgetary constraints to expect any personnel
increases to improve the prosecution of fisheries
violations. So the goal of NOAA General Counsel then
becomes assessing a fine amount that will yield a reasonable
probability of settlement and payment. This is essential to
decrease time and money spent prosecuting cases and
increases the effectiveness of the enforcement system. In
their paper uFisheries Law Enforcemen~: An Incentive Systems
Perspective·, Timothy Hennessey and David Kaiser illustrate
this problem as shown in figure 10 "'. NOAA General Counsel
is placed in the difficult position of achieving a level of
fines that will actually be paid by fishermen, will deter
further violations, and will be acceptable to the fishing
industry and other political entities whose const' tuencies
are affected by the enforcement systemo,.
96 Timothy Hennessey and David Kaiser, "Fisheries Law Enforcement, an Incentive Systems
Perspective", p 140.
97 Timothy Hennessey and David Kaiser, "Fisheries Law Enforcement, an Incentive Systems
Perspective", p.139.
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$
Amount of
Fine
o
o
Fishery Managers
NOAAGC
Probability of Payment
Time
Fishermen
Fishery Managers: Prefer stiff fines, rapid payment
Fishermen Prefer low fines, long time for payment
NOAA G.C· Must find a balance in the middle
Fig.10. Amount of Fine vs. Probability of Payment and Time
These arguments and the associated problems are well
supported by Frailey and Taylor (1987):
U •• • probabilities (of conviction, punishment)
shrink as penalties rise. The prosecutor looks
more closely at the evidence in a blg-ticket case.
A high-penalty case is less likely to be settled
before the hearing stage. The higher the stakes,
the greater the chances the fisherman will hire an
attorney and avail himself of every procedural
right, including a petltion for review to the
Administrator and an appeal to district court.
The farther along the case progresses, the less
likely the decision maker is to appreciate the
significance of the violation or the necessity for
a heavy sanction. And all this time, the
fisherman has not paid a dime to anyone but his
lawyer. If he does have to pay eventually, he has
amortized the debt over several years.
In addition, the higher the level of the
assessed penalty, the greater the likelihood that
the fisherman will exert whatever political
influence over the process and level of sanction
8]
he can mus ter. In some cases, the ef ferts can be
successful. In a~~ cases, agency presecucors are
forced to spend valuable time preparing bri2f' ng
memoranda and meeting with superiors to explain
why the particular penalty was assessed in a
specific case;;
It lS clear that the simple solution of raising ~he pe a~~y
to a sufficient level to remove economic incent've to
violate a fisheries regulation is currently not feasi~le.
To validate the relationship between the level of lie
assessed penalty and the reasonable probability o[
settlement and payment of that fine, trends for t e NMFS
Northeas t Reg ions were examined. Figure 11 compares the
annual average penalty assessed in the NOVA to the n mber of
cases that were se!::tled for that year.
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Fig. 11. Assessed Penalty vs. Cases Settled, NMFS Northeast
Region. Source: Enforcement Management Information System
98 Margaret Frailey and Robert Taylor. "Rationalizing Sanctions for Fisheries Violations", p.230.
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In cases for the years 1991-1993, the average pel a~:y
assessed exceeded $8,000 and few cases were settled. On the
other hand, in 1990 and 1994-1995 there were a h'gh numbe~
of cases settled (24-39%) as a result of average fines
assessed below $8,000. There is an inverse relations~1~p
between the amount of the assessed penalty and l] e
probability of settling a case, and it appears for Lhe last
five years assessing penalties below an $8,000 threshold has
resulted in the greatest percentage of settled cases.
Since it is the perceived penalty that influences
compliance with regulations, the relationship between ti e
assessed penalty and the actual negotiated penalty or
settlement in the NMFS Northeast Region was examined.
Figure 12 compares the average assessed penalty to the
average fine paid for settled cases. In fiscal years 1990
and 1991, the actual fine paid was greater than half of the
assessed penal ty. In fiscal year 1992 when the average
assessed penal ty skyrocketed to $24,867, the actual fines
paid as a result of settlements declined from fiscal year
1991 levels and accounted for just 2.8 percent of the
assessed penalty. Lowering of assessed penalties in fiscal
years 1993-1995 have resulted in a stabilization of the
settled fines to approximately SO percent of the assessed
penalty.
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AVG ASSESSED NOVA vs AVG SETTLEMENT AMT
NMFS N.E. REGION. 1990-1995
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Fig. 12. Average Assessed Penalty
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Settlement
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If regulatory compliance is a function of the per_eived
penalty, does setting a fine at a level resulting in high
settlement rates and decreased workload for NOAA General
Counsel achieve adequate levels of deterrence? This lS a
di f ficul t question to answer, because of fenses agains t the
MFCMA do not receive the same punishment. Clearly, some
offenses are far more serious than others, and guidance as
to the appropriate levels of penalties for different
categories of violations is provided by penalty schedules
published by NMFS enforcement. Comparing average penalties
assessed and average fines settled upon to illegal gains
does not reflect variances in the severity of offenses. For
example, some violations of regulations do not directly
84
affect the state of the fishery but are intended m8re .. r-,... -,,,
facilitate enforcement (e.g. the requirement to 1 ave a
permit onboard or to display vessel numbers properly). It
is estimated that these enforcement type violations account
for as much as 60% of total violations'-
A comparison of fines to illegal gains was attemp ed by
using assumptions, the most important being he average
penalties consist primarily of resource-type offenses and a
relative insignificant amount of enforcement-type of enses.
This assumption could not be validated with Office of
General Counsel Northeast Region, citing inaccuracy of the
EMIS database 1oc'. Nonetheless, of the total cases for fiscal
year 1995, enforcement-type offenses were either dismissed
or handled by summary settlement and accounted for 47
percent of the cases. This figure is relatively close to
Frailey and Taylor's estimate of a 60 percent rate of
enforcement-type offenses. It is concluded that the average
penalty paid in fiscal year 1995 for settled cases was
$2,004.87 and for prosecuted cases $4,183.03; and these
penalties most likely apply to resource-type offenses.
How do these fines compare with illegal gains benefited
from viola t ing fisheries regulations? Extens i ve research
conducted by Jon Sutinen, Alison Rieser and Jon Gauvin for
99 Margaret Frailey and Robert Taylor. "Rationalizing Sanctions for Fisheries Violations", p.220
100 Office of General Counsel, Northeast Region, interview by author, Gloucester, Massachusetts,
29 March 1996. OGC confirmed enforcement type offenses typically have low penalties assessed and are
frequently handled by summary settlement or dismissed to reserve attorney time for resource-type offenses.
However OGC refutes the low average penalty value provided by EMIS. The EMIS database is known to
have inherent reporting inaccuracies.
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the New England Fisheries Management Cou ..cil (NEFMC) 1n
estimated the illegal gains for a typical frequent vicla~~:
of the Northeast Multi-species Fishery to vary from $S~J -
$10,000 per trip depending on the type of violation, for a
total annual illegal gain of $20,000 - $225,000 pe~ year
Al tr,0Jgh thi s es t ima te is 8 years old when compared to 1995
penalties, it can be assumed the illegal gains have rerr:a:'l,,,d
the same or increased as a result of
performance of fisheries from 1987-1995.
the dec~ in: ; ig
Illegal gains will vary from fishery to fishery, but it
is expected they will be the highest in overcapitalized,
highly regulated, high value fisheries such as Northeast
Multispecies, Atlantic Sea Scallop, and Summer Flounde-
fisheries. Information for individual fisheries is not
available to calculate illegal gains or average penalties by
each fishery, so the figures used in my comparison wi] 1 be
those calculated from NMFS and the NEFMC report.
To remove the economic benefit of violating the
Magnuson Act, the penalty must remove the benefits of
committing a crime. With an average estimated illegal gain
of $900 $10,000 a trip, these levels of penalties mig-ht
discourage illegal activity in fisheries that are not
overcapi tal i zed or do not yield signi f icant revenue from
illegal activity. However, if the estimated annual illegal
101 Jon Sutinen, Alison Rieser & Jon Gauvin. "Measuring and Explaining Noncompliance in
Federally Managed Fisheries", p_347.
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gain 1S $20,000 $225,000, current penalty levels ale
grossly inadequate to compel compliance.
The limitations of this comparison are significa::'--., but
it is the best that can be made with the available
information. Ideally the effectiveness of penalties waul
be measured by comparing the gain from a particular i~legal
activity to the penalty schedule, as well as the resu=-;:~ng
penalty paid by the respondent. Until EMIS is modified to
provide this information reliably, the effectiveness of the
penalties can only be estimated through sketchy data and
reasonable assumptions.
PERMIT SANCTIONS
Sanctions on a vessel's federal fisheries permit are
expressly authorized in section 308 of the MFCMA. "In any
case in which a vessel has been used in the commission of an
act prohibited under section 307, the Secretary may - (I)
revoke any permi t issued wi th respect to such vessel or
person, with or without prejudice to the issuance of
subsequent permits"'·. Permit suspensions and revocations
can be a highly effective form of penalty assessment.
Permit sanctions can be relatively swift, becoming
effective immediately upon completion of review by NOAA G.C.
(before an administrative hearing takes place). The
offender faced with a permit sanction would have to obtain
an injunction to prevent it from coming into effect. Permit
sanctions also have an economic impact greater than the
102 Magnuson Fishery and Conservation Management Act, US. Code, vol 16 sec. 1861 at 308.
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maximum penalty that can be assessed under the M?C~A.
fisherman not only loses profits; he must continue pay::::-:g
fixed costs (mortgage and insurance payments, docking fees,
etc. ) . The terms 0 f a permi t sanct ion usua lly prohib~~:
fishermen from using their vessels in any fishery or us:ng
the suspension period to perform maintenance on the vessel
(annual dry-docking, etc).
A problem identified with permit sanctions is that they
impose a financial hardship on individuals other than ~. i:c>
owner or master who are not the target of the permit
sanction. The unintended effect of a permit suspension may
result in placing crewmembers out of work. This lS
mitigated by the fact that many crews are paid on a
percentage of the vessel's trip landings, and as such there
are many instances where the crew pressures the captain to
commit violations to increase their share of the trip
earnings.
The increased use of permits in federal fisheries makes
permit sanctions an increasingly viable option. Since
ad~~nistrative hearings are not required before implementing
a permit sanction, this is a way to implement swift and
severe punishment. As such, it should be reserved for use
on the most frequent or flagrant violations of the MFCMA.
To do otherwise would result in we] I-organized fishermen
associat ions protes t ing the use 0 f permi t sanct ions, and
probable legislative changes
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to the MFCMA requiring
administrative
sanctions.
hearings before implementing permit
SUMMARY
The present levels of penalties assessed is ~ot
sufficient to remove the economic benefits of non-compliance
wi th fisher ies regula t ions in the Northeas t Region. ':";le
levels of penalties assessed to fishermen viola ing the
Magnuson Act must be raised significantly to remove t"'tO
economic ra t ional i ty of non-compl iance. Rai s ing t~le
assessed penalties, however, significantly increases the
amount of cases contested at administrative hearings. To
keep the civil penalty process flowing, the Coast Guard
should pursue the following recommendations.
First, increased use of summary settlement should be
used for minor infractions of the MFCMA. This method of
quickly assessing a small fine should be targeted towards
enforcement-type offenses. The low fines and rapid case
resolution will improve the fisherman's perception of the
fairness of the system and reduce case workload for NOAA
General Counsel.
Second, the policy of limit':"ng the Administrative Law
Judge's de novo penalty to the penalty assessed in the NOVA
should be eliminated. The possibility of receiving a higher
fine as a result of an administrative hearing will be
incentive to settle out of court. This too will reduce NOAA
General Counsel's workload, which will be needed to
implement the next two recommendations.
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Third, NOAA General Counsel should prosecute ._11c
frequent and flagrant violators to the fullest extent
permissible by law. This '.;Jill take sign' ficant time and
resources for NOAA General Counsel, but it will remove the
economic incentive for resource-type violatiols.
Publicizing the successful prosecution of resource-type
offenses will serve a two-fold purpose; the perceived
fairness and credibility of the system will increase and
resource- type of fenses wi 11 decrease because the percei ved
probability of severe penalties will influence rational
people's compliance decisions. The initial investment of
resources by NOAA General Counsel to implement this
recommendation should pay-off in a decreased future case-
load.
Fourth, NOAA General Counsel should judiciously make
greater use of permit sanctions for frequent or flagrant
violators of resource-type offenses. This swift and severe
form of penalty must be exerc1sed with caution, for abuse of
this powerful sanction could result in its loss. A
fisherman that flagrantly commits resource-type offenses has
abused his right to fish; as such he should lose that right.
Finally, the EMIS database used to track the status of
fisheries violations should be overhauled to better provide
the data necessary to measure the effectiveness of the
penalty process. Average fines for individual fisheries
plans and types of offenses should be extractable to provide
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a reliable comparison to illegal gains of t~) e ilL.<::~
activities.
Even if every infraction of the MFOltA were documented,
reasonable compliance cannot be achieved without an
effective system to sanction the offenders. Inadequa e
compliance with fisheries regulations resu ts in failed
management measures. Unfortunately increased resources
deal with these fisheries problems are not forthcoming. ':'11e
apparent chasm separating the disparity between the benefi~J
of illicl.t activities and the levels of penalties must be
better measured and evaluated.
9]
CHAPTER FrVE
FUTURE FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
Future fisheries management demands on Coast G ard
maritime enforcement assets will come on two fronts;
increased use of quota management systems and a d:::-ain on
fixed domestic enforcement assets for international
fisheries enforcement as a result of implement'ng
legislation for U.S. participation in the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization (NAFO) Successful implementation
of these management regimes, without compromising management
goals, wi] 1 have to come from increased efficiency within
the enforcement system. It has been shown that efficiency
in the enforcement system must be improved in the following
three areas: (1) development of enforceable regulations; (2)
capabi:.ities of the Coast Guard; and (3) prosecut.ion of
violators. As New Zealand's fisheries expe ience
104
demonstrates, only when enforcement is effective enough to
convince potential violators that they will be caught and
prosecuted will compliance reach satisfactory levels F '-!.
103 Public Law 104-43. The Fisheries Act of 1995 amended the Fishennen's Protective Act and
included implementing legislation for US. participation in NAFO
Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, The Use of Individual
Transferable Quotas in which Individual Fishennen are Allocated Fixed Quota Shares which Entitle them to
Catch a Percentage of the Total Allowable Catch: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Fisheries
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OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this chapter is not to debate tte erits
or shortcomings of the United States' participation in NAF8
or the use of quota management systems. I stead,
acknowledges that the dynamic nature of fisheries ma .agemenc
wi:l likely result in the implementation of these rna agement
regimes. The objective of this chapter is to idenc:fy
issues involving maritime enforcement for these managemenl
regimes, and propose possible solutions for the successfu.1
implementation of these measures.
TRENDS TOWARDS QUOTA MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
In the 1990's, four federally regulated fisheries under
the MFCMA have changed to quota management systems; Atlantl
surf clam/ocean quahog, wreckfish, Pacific halibut, and
Pacific sablefish. Various forms of quota management
systems are in use, such as individual trans ferable quotas
(ITQ' s), individual fishery quotas (IFQ' s) , individual
vessel quotas (IVQ's), and community development quotas
(CDQ' s) . Each has unique aspects, but a 11 will be
collectively referred to as a quota management system. The
inc_eased use of quota management systems in the 1990's can
be expected to continue as a result of policy and political
momentum. Policy momentum is reflected in Vice President Al
Gore's National Performance Review (NPR) and the NMFS
Strategic Plan. The NPR specifically tasks NOAA with
Management. I03rd Cong., 1st sess., 9 February 1994, p613 Statement of Rolland Schmitten, Assistant
Administrator for Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries SelV'ice, NOAA
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developing and implementing controlled-acc2ss pJa s ~h~~
~nclude individual harvesting rights, such as JTC's, in
accordance with provisions of the Magnuson ~~~ This
direction IS reflected In the NMFS Strategi:: Plan. I:;
addition political momentum t.owards use of quo a manageme;,~
.is evident on bo:::.h the House and Sena~.p re-au horizat ie,r;
bills of the MFCVlli.
The Coast Guard has identified as a future tren' LId:
resource managers will implement quota management an
license lim.itation regimes in all major fisheries'" This
IS not likely in the NMFS Northeast Region. Quota
management systems work best for single species with a
narrow geographic range harvested by a single gear type.
Many of the commercial fisheries under federal management in
the NMFS Northeast Region have characteristics that make
them unsuitable for quota management syste~s. The
exceptions are Atlantic sea scallops and summer flound r
which are well suited for future quota management.
The National ITQ Study Report concluded the Atlantic
sea scallop f i.shery is well sui ted for a quot r managemPGt
program and sigr ificant benefits are likely to accrue to
industry and the public if an appropriately designed program
105 Report of the National Performance Review "Creating a Government that Works Better and
Costs Less", Department of Commerce Section, Action item # I, 7 September 1993.
106 Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study.
COMDTTNST 16214, Dec 93, pS-7
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were implemented The fishery is ge8grap ically
constrained to two offshore fleets of vessels, one working
out of NeltJ England ports and the other out Jf Mid ALlanii::-:
ports. The fishery is harvested primar' ly by one ge r type
(dredges), although nets are occasionally used. Ther lS
only one species managed, but it is unresolved wheLh r sea
scallops should be managed as one, two or three separa te
stock units. These characteristics make Atlan(~c se-
scallops well suited for quota management.
Much I ike At lant ic sea scallops, summer flounder is
another fishery characterized by a single species, single
gear type (bottom trawl), single commercial jurisdicUon
(federal), and limited geographic range (summer rlounder
migrate inshore/offshore, and are harvested by one fleet of
vessels operating primarily from mid-Atlantic states). As
such, summer flounder is another federally managed fishery
suited for quota management.
Other federally managed fisheries in the Northeast
Region are not likely to be managed by a quota system due to
jurisdictional, multi-species or multi-gear issues. It is
feasible that half of the commercially active federal
fisheries in the Northeast Region may be managed by a quota
system in the future.
107 Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Consideration of
the Potential Use ofIndividual Transferable Quotas in U.S. Fisheries. 13 March 1992.
95
V~RITIME ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
It has been found that unless a quota managemeL~ syst r.
is instituted in a relatively restr::"~:,: ed econ8f 1C
environment (such as in Iceland or New Zealand), tle a loun:
of required enforcement dramatically increases The
economic environment of the United States is relativ ly
unrestricted, and as such the success of quota ma .ageme l.t
programs is heavily dependent upon law enforcement- There
are two basic maritime enforcement problems
management systems that must be addressed: (1) safeguarding
the program from non-participants, and (2) enforcemenL of
the program itself in order to obtain compliance.
SAFEGUARDING FROM NON-PARTICIPANTS
TO achieve a reasonable level of voluntary compJiance,
the fishing industry must "buy off" on proposed management
programs. In many instances world-wide, the requests
initiating quota management programs have originated from
the commercial fishing industry. The petitioning fishing
industry usually cites economic concerns such as decreasing
harvests, increasing numbers of participants, and marketing
difficulti_s as primary reasons for initiating a quota
lOS Department of Transportation, U.S Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Entorcement Study
CO:MDTINST 16214, PS-8.
109 David McKinney. "Enforcement Methodology of Federal Individual Quota Fisheries", Fisheries
Enforcement Issues, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development Committee for Fisheries
Enforcement Workshop, September 1993, p 38
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management program Many of these same economic 2~ncerns
exist with fisheries in the NMFS Northeast Region.
Indus try support for quota management systerns if;
Northeast Region lS lacking compared to other' J oea 1 i es
where quota management has been • 1 r 'llmp-temen,. ea.
represents the fishermen, fishing organizations, dnd fishing
industry representatives that have recently been ac ve LI,
voicing their opinions on this issue to Congress.
support of quota management by industry ean be at ~ibu ed to
many reasons; review of Congressional testimony reveals
allocation of quotas to be the common issue cited amongst
non-supporters. If a quota management system is implemented
in the NMFS Northeast Region, lack of support for the
management regime by the allocation "losers" will likely
result in a rise in illegal activity by non-quota holders.
Increased maritime enforcement will be necessary, at least
initially unt'l the fleet re-structures or re-directs, to
protect from non-participants. Without adequate protection
from poaching and smuggling by non-participants, there will
be l'~tle incentive for program participants to comply.
Participants must be confident that others cannot beat he
system and thus diminish the value of their quota rights l : ..
110 David McKinney_ "Enforcement Methodology of Federal Individual Quota Fisheries", p 38
III Department of Transportation, U_S Coast Guard. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Study,
COMDTINST 16214, P 5-9.
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Table 4
Organizations Politically Active Regarding ITQ's
ORGANIZATION FOR ITQ's AGAINST ITQ's
Fisher Foods Inc X
Mid-Atlantic Foods X
Mr.Rita F/V Odyssey X
MA Inshore Lobster X
Fishermen
Maine Sardine X
Council
Gloucester X
Fishermen's Wives
Assoc
Maine Lobstermen's X
Assoc
Mr.Ames Fisherman X
Ms. Didriksen, F/V X
owner
Seafarer's X
International Union
Associated X
Fisheries of ME
Source: Multiple Congressional hearings, 1994-1995---
ENFORCEMENT OF PROGRAM TO OBTAIN COMPLIANCE
Enforcement is not only essential to keep non-
participants out of the fishery, it is also necessary to
maintain management integrity by ensuring adequate
compliance by participants. Due to the nature of quota
management, these programs can add incentives to under-
report and/or misreport actual catches by individuals in the
fishery. The nature of potential violations would shift
from illegal harvesting to misreporting catches. Therefore
112 Testimony before the following hearings regarding re-authorization of the MFCMA and ITQ's
and user fees under the MFCMA were reviewed, and industry comments were compiled. Non-industry
comments (i.e. Greenpeace, WWF, Center for Marine Conservation, etc.) were discounted.
"5.39, Hearing on the Reauthorization of the MFCMA", Rockport ME, 4 March 95
"S.39, Hearing on the Reauthorization of the MFCMA", Boston, MA, 4 March 95.
"Fisheries User Fees Under the MFCMA" .. 29 Jun 94
"Transferable Quotas Under the MFCMA", 9 Feb 94.
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it is presumed. that enforcement emphl3sis rn st
maritime to shores ide detection efforts. The Coast Guard's
presumption that quota management will
enforcement effort shores ide and significantly reduce ,~1.,,).
eliminate maritime enforcement is flawed:". Although it is
true that shores ide enforcement effort must increase, it is
the supplemental regulations necessary in a quo::-.a manag,-:-:j
fishery that requires continued maritime enforcement. Quota
management does not eliminate the need to protect fish
during spawning, prohibit destructive gear, restrict the
size of fish caught, or mitigate user conflicts.
Depending on the fishery, management goals must
supplement quotas with time and area closures, gear
restrictions, and limits on discards. In New Zealand, quota
fisheries retained many of the regulatory controls of closed
areas, minimum sizes and gear restrictions which were at the
heart of the pre-ITQ regime. TAC's and ITQ's were in fact
superimposed on that regime rather than replacing i t ~l.. The
need to incorporate previous management measures in quota
fisheries only adds another layer of complexity for
enforcement: shoreside monitoring and compliance. The ~evel
of maritime enforcement will at a minimum remain at the pre-
IIJ Department of Transportation, U.S Coast Guard. Survey of District Fisheries Enforcement
Branches, CG Atlantic Area (Aoo-2) Memo 5700 dtd 28 Ju195. As part of the implementation of the
Atlantic Area Fisheries Enforcement Strategic Plan, all CG District fisheries law enforcement offices were
surveyed to develop a "Rules of Thumb" guide to assist Council members to evaluate the enforceability of
particular management measures as FMP's are being developed. All CG District fisheries law enforcement
offices reported ITQ/IFQ management measures as not applicable to maritime enforcement.
114 T. McClurg, "Two Fisheries Enforcement Paradigms: New Zealand before and after ITQ's", p
125
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quota management level. Increased effort will be neC2SS, rj.!
to prevent non-participants dissatisfied with J tia~
allocations from compromising the system, ard as Quota
management opens fisheries for greater periods of time (as
in the surf clam/ocean quahog and Pacific 1 alibut and
sablefish fisheries), greater periods of at-sea presence and
enforcement will be necessary.
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN NAFO
A second and perhaps simpler chaJ. 'enge to .c.' h .LlSller-LeS
enforcement in the NMFS Northeast Region results from tn
United State's participation in NAFO. Once again, the
purpose is not to debate the merits or shortcomings of this
decision; it is merely to identify the implications of this
decision on maritime enforcement in the NMFS Northeast
Region.
Seventeen nat ions are members of NAPO, which manages
a 1 fisheries in its defined area of jurisdiction (figure
13) with the exception of salmon, swordfish, tuna and marlin
which are managed by other international organizations
Due to ext ensi ve over fishing in both t he Cd~icidian r~z and
the NAPO reg latory area, most high value species are under
loratorium. The only species assigned TAC's for 1995 were
illex squid (statistical areas 3 and 4), redfish (divisions
3M, 3L, 3N), and cod (division 3M)". The poor condition of
115 Fisheries Act of 1995, Public Law I04-43, Background and need for legislation
116 1994 NAPO Annual Report, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada. April 1995, p 38
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fisheries in the NAFO regulatory area has signifi2~n~
implications for u.s. enforcement.
M~ARITIME ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
New England fishermen have lobbied successfully aga~nsL
u.s. accession to the NAFO convention since 1983. Alc[cugh
several factors account for this success, marit~ e
enforcement is the only remaining issue New England
fishermen have argued that the obligations for en~orcement
incurred by participating in NAFO would reduce the number oE
Coast Guard assets available for domestjc fisheries
enforcement. This position is correct; the Coast Guard has
a limited amount of enforcement effort available for
fisheries enforcement in the NMFS Northeast Region. Any
increased effort directed towards international fisheries
enforcement would result in a proportional decrease lD
domestic fisheries enforcement. The Fisheries Act of 1995
does not provide additional funding or resources for
international fisheries enforcement.
What will be the Coast Guard's obligated effort for
enforcement of NAFO rules? The NAFO Conservatjon and
Enfo cement Measures states: "where, aL~ any time, more than
15 vessels of anyone Contracting Party are engaged in
fishing operations or in the processing or transferring of
117 There were three primary factors besides enforcement that prevented the passage of
implementing legislation for U.S. participation in NAFO. First, it could not be agreed upon which federal
agency should represent the U.S at NAFO and select U.S commissioners. Second, U.S fishennen had
little interest in NAFO fisheries given the renewed interest in fisheries within the U.S. EEZ with passage of
the MFCMA. Finally, U.S. fishermen were concerned that NAFO would seek to manage other fisheries.
Today these issues are no longer relevant, and the need to become a participant in NAFO to maintain
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Fig. 13. Northwest Atlantic Fishing Organization (NAFO)
Regulatory Area
international stature for support of high seas fishery treaty negotiations has overridden the enforcement
Issue.
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fish in the Regulatory Area, that Contrac:=ing Party slia.-::-",
during that time, have an inspector or other desig;,o~cJ
authority present in the Regulatory Area.
respond, without delay, to notice of apPd>en~
infringements":: . The objective for the Un~~ed Sta~2S
should be to limit the participation of its fishing vessels
in the NAFO regulatory area to less than fifteen a year, so
that the Coas t Guard wi 11 not have to reauce dO;:k's l :,~
fisheries enforcement in the NMFS Northeast Region to ~i?et
international fisheries enforcement obligations.
This objective should not be too difficult to achieve.
In 1984 the International Court of Justice resolved a
maritime boundary dispute between the United States and
Canada, giving nearly one-third of Georges Bank to Canada in
the establishment of the Hague Line. As a result of this
action, a limited number of U.S. vessels fished the NAFO
area on the "nose" and "tail" of the banks with marginal
Since 1983 the declining stocks in the
NAFO regulatory area has resulted in no directed fishing fo:
118 NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures (NAFOIFC Doc 96/1), Dartmouth, Nova
Scotia, Canada Jan 1996. Part IV, para 3, p 21. There are two interpretations of this document. One is that
enforcement presence is required only when there are 15 or more vessels present in the regulatory area at
one time. The other is that enforcement presence is required when 15 or more vessels fish the regulatory
area in an annual period. The Canadian government advocates the second interpretation, and in the interest
of fishery relations with Canada the U.S. should interpret this document similarly.
. 119 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, International
Fisheries. )03rd Cong, 2nd sess., 21 July 1994, p53. Statement of Jeffrey Kaelin, executive director, Maine
Sardine Council
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the high value species pursued ln 1983 The long voyage
and poor fishing opportunities resulted in only E U.S.
vessels fishing the regulatory area in 1994; no U.S. vessels
fished the regulatory area in 1995, no' have U.S. vesseJs
indicated a desire to fish the regulatory area i I 1996 when
the U.S. receives a quota, of which we p esently lave
none This lack of interest by U. S. vessels to fish the
NAFO regulatory area is due to economics, and in the short-
run wi 11 resul t in a voluntary 1 irni tat ion 0
effort in the NAFO regulatory area.
U.S. fishing
t is also unlikely the U.S. will receive a significant
quota to support the effort of fifteen vessels. Canadian
Fisheries Minister Brian Tobin stated nthis will not be in
the short term the source of major new fishing opport nities
of U.S. I"fleets n -. The seventeen members of NAFO have taken
substantial reductions in quotas over the last five years.
Further reduction of those quotas to provide the U.S. with a
substantial quota is very unlikely. Until stocks rebound
and quotas increase, NAFO will not be a significant factor
in maritime enforcement for the NMFS Northeast Region.
SUMMARY
Due to a limited and fixed number of resources to
conduct maritime enforcement in the NMFS Northeast Region,
120 NAFO Annual Report. 1994. No directed fishing for high value species except for a small cod
quota in division 3M.
121 William 1. Quigley, LCDR, USCG. US Department of State, interview by author 12 April 95.
122 Pamela Glass, "NAFO: What Will it Mean for US Fishermen':''', National Fisherman. vol 76.
no. 9. p52.
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the Coast Guard must be creative and proactive t:; me_~
future challenges to fisheries enforcement. In ~he i\J""MFS
Northeas t Reg ion, these challenges wi 11 mater ~al i ze as a
result of the United State's participation in NAFO and _ne
increased use of quota fisheries as a management ~eaStlre.
NAFO
In the short run, NAFO will not pose a se~irus
challenge to maritime enforcement due to economics. As t: e
condition of the stocks of high value species improve in ~he
long term, interest to fish in the regulatory area by U. S.
fishing vessels will also increase. Since the Coast Guard
has limited capabilities to enforce the regulatory area
without compromising its domestic enforcement, specific
measures are recommended to keep U. S. fishing effort below
fifteen vessels so the Coast Guard is not required to
conduct enforcement patrols]:] .
The Fisheries Act of 1995 directs the Secretary of
Commerce to issue permits to U.S. fishing vessels engaged in
harvesting on the high seas:'. The Secretary is given the
discretion to place conditions and restrictions on permits
issued. The Coast Guard should lobby NOAA to restrj.ct the
number of high seas fishing permits that allow fishing
within the NAFO regulatory area by either a limitation of
high seas fishing permits that allow fishing in the NAFO
123 Occasional and brief enforcement presence by a Coast Guard cutter in the NAFO regulatory
area would not disrupt domestic enforcement, and is recommended although it is not required for the
interests of maintaining an international image of a responsible fisheries nation
124 Fisheries Act of 1995, Public Law 104-42, sec. 104
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regulatory area or by implement ing a high seas IVC pi:>' ~d.n:
for the future U. S. share of the NAFO quota. The
Guard and NOAA must be proactive on this issue, wh.i.':'-e
fishing interest lS minimal. The most difficult po.rt
managing a limited entry management system is tte ~llccaLi~n
of the rights to fish. By acting now, when stocks ar low
and the U.S. has no quota, the allocation issue is
minimized. I f the Coas t Guard and NOAA wa i t unt j 1 the
stocks improve and the U.S. has a sigr~=-ficant TAC, '-it?
economic viability of fishing the NAFO regulatory area will
increase U.S. fishing interests In NAFO. Allocation of
fishing rights will be a major point of contention, and it
may be impossible to limit the number of U.S. vessels with
access to the NAFO regulatory area to less than fiftee',
vessels. Action must be taken now, before allocatic~.
becomes an impediment to limiting U.S. fishing vessel access
to NAFO.
QUOTA FISHERIES
Although there is a definite trend towards the use OC
quota fisheries systems in fisheries management., politici:i~
polarization of the issue in the NMFS Northeast Region by
fishing interests makes it difficult to predict if, when and
which fisheries will be quota managed in the future.
Nonetheless, the Coast Guard must be proactive on this issue
and be prepared to advise decision makers on the
capabilities of enforcement to successfully implement these
new regulations.
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To begin, any quota management system rr:,lst :_dve
enforceable regulations to succeed. Fisheries managers wilJ
never draft a management plan strictly frem an eG~:;r::::pr:1er'­
standpoint. They do have the responsibility to draf~
regulations within the capabilities of enforcement agencies
to ensure adequate compliance. It is the responsibil~ty ~~
the Coast Guard designee to the FMC's to provide "expe;-t
advice" on proposed plans and regulations. If that advice
is poor, the success of the proposed plan is compremisi"d.
The Coast Guard position that maritime enforcement is not
appl icable or necessary to quota management regimes
compromises the success of those plans. As demonstrated in
New Zealand's enforcement sys terns before and af ter ITQ' s,
traditional physical surveillance activities are still a
vital part of the enforcement regime'~' The Coast Guard
must reverse its position on enforcement of quota management
systems and provide the necessary expert advice to ensure
enforceable management measures.
Equally important to the success of maritime
erJorcement of quota management systems is the deterrent
effect of successful prosecution of violators. Although the
Coas t Guard has no direct control over the civi 1 penal ty
process exercised by NOAA's Office of General Counsel
Northeast Region, their capabilities to prosecute violations
significantly affect compliance and maritime enforcement.
125 T. McClurg, "Two Fisheries Enforcement Paradigms: New Zealand Before and After ITQ's",
P 131.
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In New Zealand quota fisheries it was found t~at strong
incentives to cheat were coupled with a strong incentive co
mount a very vigorous defense against proseclltion i~ charged
with a serious offense. This has led to longer a.6 more
complex investigations followed by longer and m~re expenSlve
court cases in New Zealand quota fisheries-~'. The Office of
General Counsel Northeast Region currently does not have the
resources to adequately prosecute violations of traditional
management measures. The higher fines, co plex
investigations and drawn-out court cases associated with
quota management systems will overload an al eady
beleaguered system. Without additional prosecutorial
resources, adequate compliance for quota fisheries wi 11 be
unobtainable and management plans will fail.
As the expert advisors to the Fisheries Management
Councils on matters involving maritime fisheries
enforcement, the Coas t Guard can prevent quota management
systems from becoming a challenge to maritime enforcement.
The Fisheries Management Councils will not implement a
Fisheries Management Plan they know will not succeed. If
the Coast Guard designee to the Councils presents the fixed
enforcement capabilities of the Coast Guard as a limitation
to enforcing the additional complexities of quota management
systems along with Office of General Counsel's assessment of
their difficulties in prosecuting violations to achieve
126 T. McClurg, "Two Fisheries Enforcement Paradigms: New Zealand Before and After lTQ's",
p 130,
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adequate compliance, the Fisheries Management Councils wi 1,:
be less inclined to implement additional quota
systems in the Northeas t Region. An honest assessme
capabilities by the Coast Guard and NOAA coupled w' ~;-1
proactive action should be sufficient to
maritime enforcement challenges.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
The objective of maritime fisheries en·orcement 15 t- ,.",'.' ,
achieve an adequ.ate level of compl iance w' h f j S1L1'" j es
regu lat ions so the conservation and management gc-1s
management plans are achieved. The greatest obstacle to
achieving this objective is the separation "I"\.' 1
responsibilities for functions of maritime fisheries
e. forcement amongst different organizations and agencies.
These fun tions: development of enforceable regulations,
e1forcement of those regulations, and prosecu ion of
violators make up the maritime fisheries enforcement system.
As w'th any system, mar' time fisheries enEo cerlent i.s en y
as strong as its weakest link.
Presen ly the weak link for maritime fisheries
enfercement ), he NMFS Northeast Region is the proseeu inn
of via dtions of the Magnuson Act. Responsibility for thi
fU.lcU.on of the mar it 1me fisheries enforcement sys tern 1ies
with NOAA, speci~ica~ly the Office of General Counsel,
Northeast Region. WeJ 1 written regulations and adequate
enforcement efforl: w: :.1 ::dil to achieve adequate levels of
comp] :.ance
viol, tors.
the system does not
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adequately sanction
1'he present levels of penal ies assessed L;t JvI?CjV!.A
violations is not s 'ff'cien- to remove the e .onemic be J2fits
of non-compliance with fisheries reg' lacions If: l-he ~oJTv'!'FS
Northeast Region. This shortcoming can be attjbtted In lWG
fac ::ors: lack 0 f manpower to prosec' _e ca ses, aI'l.~ pnll~ i.!o: S
reducing the capabiJ'ties of the Office of Gen'r~l Ccu~s j
to sanction violators. To remove the economic rationality
of non-compliance, the levels of penalties assessed t n1...\.'
fisherm_ violating e MFCMA must be raised significantly.
To do so, the following actions must be taken:
• Increase the use a f summary set t lement fe:::
minor infractions of the MFCMA. Low fines and
rapid case resolution Wlu. improve t. he
fisherman's perception of the fairness of the
system and reduce case workload for NOAA
General Counsel.
• El imina te the pol icy of 1 imi t ing the
Administrative Law Judge'S de novo penalty to
the penal ty assessed in the NOVA. The
possibility of receiving a higher fine as a
result of an administrative h ,aring wi:l be
incentive to settle out of court, reducing NOAA
General Counsel's workload.
• NOAA General Counsel must
frequent and flagrant violators
extent permissible by law,
economic incentive for
violations.
prosecute the
to the fullest
removing the
resource-type
• NOAA General COimsel must judiciously make
greater use of permit sanctions for frequent or
flagrant violatJrs of resource-type oE[enses.
Fishermen that flagrantly commi t resource- type
offenses have abused their right to fish; as
such they should lose their rights to fish.
Although prosecution of violators is system
component of maritime fisheries enforcement in most need of
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improvement, the actual enforcement of regulations 2drl dls~
be improved. Responsibility for thjs function of a:rit i tiP
fisheries enforcement lies with the u.s.
Improving the detect' on of violators raises t.he leve~
compliance
sanc:::'ioned.
provided those violators are
Maritime fisheries enforcement IS the most costly
method of ensuring compliance with regulations. ILs use
should be judiciously limited lest the cost of a ~ i Villg
compliance become exorbitant. In the NMFS Northeast Regjon,
annual Coast Guard effort for fisheries enforcement is
30,000 cutter hours provided by 34 Coast Guard cutter-so
This maritime fisheries enforcement effort is haphazardly
limited by budget and resource limitations.
The problem with Coast Guard fisheries enf~rcement
effort in the NMFS Northeast Region is twofold. First, it
is u'~known what level of enforcement effert is necessary and
towards which fisheries it should be directed. Second, the
Coast Guard is unable to measure the effectiveness of its
enforcement effort. hese issues must be resolved so
maritime fisher'es enforcement effort can be judici usly
controlled by the Coas. Guard and the FMC's in tile
development of regulations rather than ,~:dphazardly
controlled by budget and resource allocation priorities.
Quantifying enforcement effort and measuring the
effectiveness of that effort requires evaluation of required
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enforcement by individual FMP's.
actions must be taken:
• Make widespread use of the '92 Composite Model.
This analytical model is a tool co assisc
regional operational commanders in establis 'ng
enforcement effort necessary for individual
F lP's (enforcement goals - output)
• Modify measurement databases (Abstract 0
Operations, SABRE, EMIS) to measure the 0 'tcome
of enforcement effort. The data being
collected is not useable because it is not
collected by individual FMP's. The ability to
measure the outcome of specific en:orcement
effort by FMP is essential to validate the
model outputs.
• validate enforcement goals (output) with
conservation goals (outcomes) This may
involve increasing or decreasing enforcement
effort for a particular plan. Fisheries policy
makers (FMC's) should be involved in the
validation process. Awareness of the
enforcement outputs required by their
management decisi0ns as well as the Coast
Guard's ability to meet the requirements of
those decisions will impact future policies.
Inability of the Coast Guard to meet required
outputs will result in inadequate outcomes and
the eventual failure of management decisions.
Ten years ago, developing enforceable fisheries
regulations would have been the weak link in the maritime
enforcement system. Today it is the strongest. Although
responsibility for this function of the maritime fisheries
enforcement system lies with the regional fishery management
councils, NOAA, the USCG, l\1MFS and various state enforcement
agencies participate in this process. All responsible
parties for the enforcement system interact in the council
process, overcoming the obstacle
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of separation of
responsibilities. The improvemen _
regulations can be attributed to this interac jen.
Development of management plans involves ~nn~irlpratjol
of statutory requirements, conservation goals, soc':'aJ air)
economic factors as well as enforceabil~~y. It" is tr preEc~'_
unreasonable to expect fishery managers to dev lop d
perfectly enforceable management pldn. Improvement.s tn
enforceability can still be made through measures th~t
promo::e voluntary compliance.
The Coast Guard must encourage development of
management plans that are acceptable to industry and user
groups to promote voluntary compliance.
high levels of voluntary compliance require minimal
enforcement, freeing additional enforcement effort for
fisheries with high levels of non-compliance.
the Coast Guard must:
To do this,
• Quant i fy enforcement
and advise the FMC's
measures result in
allocation.
effort necessary by FMP,
how changes in management
trade-offs in enforcement
The compler L:m of the Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement
Study indicates the Coast Guard is beginning to accept
maritime fisheries enforcement as d system. Maritime
fisheries enforcement is no longer viewed solely on cutter
hours, boardings and violations. Although it will take time
for the Coast Guard to divorce itself from these
institutional measures of outputs, recent effort and success
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in developing en forceable regula t ions and i.1 en L)r:~~ITl'_nr
effort allocation is a trend that shows the Coast Guard
acknowledges
enforcement_ .
the other factors that
To date the Coast Guard has only influenced c~mpo len~s
of the enforcement system over which it has cnn_rol.
Fisheries m~nagement and enforcement is dyna ic;
trends in management, such as quota management measures nd
partjcipation in NAFO, will strain the capabilities of t l~
enforcement system to achieve reasonable compliance. The
Coast Guard must be resourceful and creative in expanding
its influence into areas it has limited influence, such as
h~ prosecution of violators. It is in this way the
fisheries enforcement challenges of the present and future
will be overcome.
This analysis of maritime fisheries enforcement in the
NMFS Northeast Region recommends improvements to all
components of the enforcement system. The weakest link J~
that system is the sanctioning of violators, as such action
on _hose recommendations are the most important. Keeping in
mind that the objective of fisherips enforcement is to
achieve an adequate level of compliance with fisheries
regulations so conservation and management goals are
achieved, the Coast Guard must abandon the emphasis on
patrol effort, boardings and violation counts. Ins tead, the
Coast Guard should ensure its enforcement effort results in
compliance by ensuring adequate sanctioning of violators.
liS
To do so, the Coast Guard must c ~)ss ins_iu:ic;n'-:J
boundaries, even at the expense of fisheries patro effort.
To accomplish t. is, the Coast G;ldrd shollld c-reaLe liP,,",'
billets assigning quali f ied personne~ (Coas t Guard lawye- s
~~ offi~ers knowledgeable in fisheries management ~nd lAW)
to the Office of General Counsel to improve the capabjl.ity
of swiftly and severely sanctioning violators. Cur ~nt
staffing levels at the Office of General Counsel is
inadequate to handle the caseload provided by l\lMFS and Cnast:
Guard enforcement agents. To continue to place emphasis on
detecting viola ons is a waste of effort and 'i?SOll~'Ces;
emphasis should be placed on improving the certaj nry uno
severity of sanctions to achieve compliance objectives.
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APPENDIX
NOAA ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS MANUAL
Northeast Multispecies Fishery - 50 CFR Part 651
Violation
Minimum Mesh Size
-- <1/2 inch
-->1/2 inch
and/or use of liner,
illegal net strengthener
or other net obstruction
Dump fish or other
matter (including nets
or other gear)
Closed Area
-- < 1/4 mile
-- > 1/4 mile
Possess or import groundfish
smaller than minimum sizes
Dealers
-- < 5% (of fish sampled)
-- > 5% (offish sampled)
Fishermen
-- < 5% (of fish sampled)
-- > 5% (offish sampled)
Exempted Fisheries Program (EFP)
-- False accounting/failure to acc!.
-- Fishing before receipt of permit
1-2.5 U
20-35 u@
20-35
**@
Warning
20-35**@
I
.5-10*
1*
5-15*
5 Plus #
1-2.5
(All figures X $1,000)
Second
2.5-10**
35-60 ** -
35-60
**
1-5
35-60**-
5*
2-30*
5-1 '"
2-30*@
10 Plus ##
25-5 *
5 Plus **
60 Plus ** @
60 Plus
**@@
2-5-10**
60 Plus **@@
1-5 '"
5 Plus*
1-5 *
5 Plus*@@
5-20 *#
'"
**
@
(ii)(ii)
'-../~
#
##
+
Plus forfeiture of illegal catch or value of illegal catch
Plus forfeiture of entire catch or value of entire catch
Plus 60-day permit suspension
Plus revocation of permit and/or vessel seizure
Plus loss of eligibility for program for one year
Plus permanent loss of eligibility for program
Plus value of excess regulated species
Plus 120 - day permit suspension
Please Note: -- Maximum fine per violation is $100,000 (as of 11/28/90)
-- Owner and Master may be charged separately (with separate
fmes) for the same offense
117
Revised 6/93
NOAA ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS MANUAL
Northeast Multispecies Fishery - continued
(All figures X $1.000)
Violation First Second Third
Catching Excess Regulated Species
(Not meeting % terms)
-- < 5% over allowance 1-5 5-25+ 10-25 ##-'-
-- > 5% over allowance 5-25#+ 10 Plus ##+@
Fishing outside EFP area
While enrolled in EFP
-- < 1/4 mile warning 1-5 2.5-10**#
--> 1/4 mile 2.5-25 ** 5-50 >f<>f<#@ 10 Plus **##
Violation First Second Third Fourth
Fishing without permit 2-5 5-10 >f< 10-20* 20 Plus"
-- without permit on board 1-2 2-5 5-10 10-15
Failure to report change
in permit information
(other than renewal) 1-2 2-5 5-10 10-15
Making false statements
to an authorized officer
or the designee of the 5-10 10-20 20-40 40-100
Regional Director
FalsitY or fail to keep
records or reports 5-10 10-20 20-40 40-100
Failure to affix/maintain
proper vessel markings .5-2 2-5 5-10 10-15
Interfere with lawful
investigation 5-20 20-50 @ 50-100@@
Failure to permit
inspection of gear 5-10 10-50@ 50-100 @@
or records
Revised 6/93
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NOAA ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS MAl\TUAL
Northeast Multispecies Fishery - continued
(All figures X $1,000)
Violation First Second Third Fourth
Dealer
Failure to maintain
records on all transfers,
purchases and receipts 2-10 10-20 20-40 40-100
Possession, custody,
control, shipment, trans-
portation, offering for
sale, selling, purchasing, .5-15 '" 2-30 '" 5 Plus **
landing, importing or
exporting groundflsh taken
in violation
Failure to maintain gear
or gear markings 2-5 * 5-10 * 10-20 * 20 Plus >.<
Aggravating or mitigating circumstances: The following factors will be con-
sidered in choosing a penalty within, above, or below the ranges set forth in
the penalty schedule and the permit sanction schedule
I. Biological impact of the violation
2. Mental state willful or intentional nature of the violation
3. Attendant circumstances:
a extraordinary cooperation, or lack thereof
b. due care standard
c attempted concealment of illicit conduct or, alteration,
disposing, destruction of evidence
d. evasion
4 Prior record
a. time since last violation
b seriousness of prior violation(s)
c. proven knowledge of the law based on prior record
5 Impact on visibility of the regulatory regime
Revised 6/93
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